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INTRODUCTION

In constitutional cases, the Supreme Court's adjudicative task requires it to define the values inherent in the text,1 find the facts that fit
into the context established by these values, 2 and, ultimately, integrate
these values and facts in a satisfactory manner. In this endeavor, neither
the values contained in the text nor the facts of the world are known with
certainty. The daily business of the Court, therefore, involves crafting
certain decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The Court has addressed this quandary by increasingly relying on a balancing methodol3
ogy that purportedly accounts for the indeterminacy of the enterprise.
This solution has been criticized, however, for permitting the Court to
ignore counterfactual information and to subtly evade making explicit its
controversial policy choices. 4 But the critics' appraisals of constitutional
balancing are correct only up to a point. The error in the Court's constitutional adjudication lies not in the balancing methodology itself, but in
how the Court employs that methodology. Done faithfully, balancing
provides the most effective method available by which to interpret the
5
Constitution.
This Article offers a method by which constitutional values and constitutional facts can be successfully integrated through a process I refer
to as "Madisonian Balancing." Madisonian Balancing does not receive
its label due to any recently discovered documents indicating James
Madison's embrace of the balancing method. In fact, the eighteenth-century Madison probably would have been surprised by many of the ideas
that I, and others, ascribe to him today. Madisonian Balancing takes
shape out of the essential structure of American constitutional democracy. While I cannot claim that Madisonian Balancing is specifically
I See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988).
2 See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding'" Exploring the Empirical
Component of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991). See generally Henry
Wolfe Bikle, Judicial Determinationof Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924); Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation,
1960 Sup. Cr. REV. 75; Henry Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229
(1985); Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in JudicialProtectionof Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1988); Jeffrey M. Shaman, ConstitutionalFact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 135 U. FLA. L. REV. 236 (1983); Ann Woolhandler,
Rethinking the JudicialReception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988).
3 Professor Henkin eloquently described balancing's allure: "It provides bridges between the
abstractions of principle and the life of facts ....
It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes room for
judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree." Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047 (1978).
4 See HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 50-52 (1968); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497, 517, 528-33 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
5 See also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1962).
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mandated by the American constitutional system, compared to the alternatives, it best exemplifies the objectives and spirit of that system. My
goal is to describe the most meticulous and conscientious method for
adjudicating constitutional cases. My primary concern is constitutional
adjudication, not constitutional interpretation.6 I focus on the constitutional method and, in particular, offer a procedure by which varying normative principles can be integrated into variable factual information.
Today, constitutional adjudication is in a state of disarray. This situation is largely attributable to the Court's failure to articulate consistent, normative constitutional contexts in which to place constitutional
facts. The Court regularly evidences complete confusion, utter indifference, or simple ignorance about fact finding in constitutional cases. 7 For
example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,8 the Court invalidated a government regulation under rationalbasis review because there
was no evidence to support it; in Burson v. Freeman,9 in contrast, the
Court upheld a government regulation under strict scrutiny review because there was no evidence against it. And in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,'0 in the course of the same opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter upheld a 24-hour waiting period and invalidated a spousal
notification provision, though the quantum of evidence was virtually the
same as to whether either posed a "substantial obstacle" to the exercise
of the abortion right." Madisonian Balancing offers a firm footing
for the currently "rootless nature"'12 of the Court's constitutional
adjudication.
This Article proposes a balancing method that fully accounts for the
values and facts inherent in the constitutional clash between individual
liberty and government interests. Madisonian Balancing begins with the
premise that a constitutional injury caused by some government action
cannot be described in a piecemeal fashion. An infringement of a due
process property right, for example, has greater constitutional significance when it also infringes freedom of speech. A court's evaluation of
the constitutionality of a challenged government action must entail a full
6 By this statement, I do not mean to join the debate over whether "adjudication is interpretation." Compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 739 (1982)
("Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by which a judge comes to understand
and express the meaning of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text.") with
Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-as-Literature
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203, 207 (1987) ("[A]djudication is not primarily an interpretive act of
either a subjective or objective nature; adjudication, including constitutional adjudication, is an imperative act.") (emphasis in original). Although my proposal clearly has relevance to this debate,
enumerating the specific ways it does so must await another day.
7 See Faigman, supra note 2, at 577-88.
8 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
9 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1856 (1992).
10 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
11 See infra note 206 for discussion of the empirical research relevant to this question.
12 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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assessment of the constitutional costs of that action. Madisonian Balancing thus operates with a Constitution-wide perspective, rather than from
a right-specific or amendment-specific viewpoint. The metric by which
individual liberty is to be balanced against government interests is constitutionality itself. The balance is struck at a transactional level, by comparing the depth of the full constitutional infringement with the
government's justification for its action. Madisonian Balancing thus aggregates rights and then balances them against the government's interests, which have always been aggregated for balancing purposes.
As currently practiced, however, balancing is mired in a bog of indeterminacy. Madisonian Balancing combines two separate lines of
thought that must be brought together to give some structure to balancing before it disappears into a constitutional muck. First, the foundational and relatively non-controversial assumptions of the Constitution
provide the main support. I refer to this pillar as the Madisonian paradigm.13 Specifically, the Madisonian paradigm refers to the dilemma
upon which American constitutional democracy rests. 14 On the one
hand, democratic majorities enjoy the fundamental right to rule as they
desire, while, on the other, individuals receive protection from
majoritarian interference in particular spheres. Any error in ascertaining
the boundary between the majority's right to rule and a minority's legitimate right to be free of such rule results in tyranny. Whereas
majoritarian interference with protected rights constitutes a tyranny by
the majority, denial of the majority's power to rule in spheres not specifically protected constitutes a tyranny by the minority.1 5 Courts are called
upon to resolve the Madisonian dilemma by carrying out the primary
task in constitutional adjudication of ascertaining and policing the
16
boundary between the two tyrannies.
The second pillar supporting Madisonian Balancing comes from an
unlikely source-the common law of evidence. Evidence scholars have
always concerned themselves with the integration of uncertain factual
information into previously defined value systems. Evidence doctrine ex13 See David L. Faigman, ReconcilingIndividual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1526-34 (1992).
14 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22-24 (1956); see also ROBERT

H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 39-41 (1990) [hereinafter BORK (1990)]; Robert H. Bork,
NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) [hereinafter Bork
(1971)].
15 Judge Robert Bork described the clash of principles as follows:
Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left to individual freedom.
Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate.
Yet, quite obviously, neither the majority nor the minority can be trusted to define the freedom
of the other. This dilemma is resolved in constitutional theory, and in popular understanding,
by the Supreme Court's power to define both majority and minority freedom through the interpretation of the Constitution.
Bork (1971), supra note 14, at 3.
16 Id.
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plicitly manipulates burdens of proof in order to allocate the risk of factual error. In contrast, although constitutional law has always depended
on facts, the integration of facts into constitutional decisions remains, at
best, implicit. The Court sometimes refers to burdens of proof when articulating constitutional doctrine, 17 but these constitutional forays into
evidence nomenclature are rarely developed with any consistency or explanation of their jurisprudential basis. The common law evidentiary
concept of burden of proof together with the concept of presumptions
provide significant assistance in making plain the premises of constitutional argument. Together with the substantive value structure of the
Madisonian model, the evidentiary procedural rules provide a viable plan
for constitutional adjudication.
This Article thus proposes to construct, by employing insights from
the Madisonian model and evidence law, a constitutional balancing
methodology that is true to the underlying structure of the Constitution
and addresses the problem of indeterminacy intrinsic to the task of integrating constitutional values and constitutional facts. Part I briefly explores the historical emergence of balancing as the ascendant method of
constitutional adjudication. In the twentieth century, balancing has
swiftly overtaken formalism as the preferred method of constitutional adjudication across the entire constitutional spectrum. 8 Part I further considers recent scholarly criticisms of balancing that call into question
whether balancing has realized its promise and that contemplate a return
to the halcyon days of formalism's predominance. This close inspection
leads to the conclusion that balancing and formalism share the failing
that they both permit the Court to achieve facile results, outcomes that
seem more the product of divination or science than constitutional
principle.
Part II introduces an evidentiary analogue into the basic Madisonian paradigm. In so doing, it provides a primer for the constitutional
scholar on the evidentiary principles of burden of proof and presumptions. The evidentiary analogy furnishes the argument for adopting a
constitutional balancing method with a much needed foundation of
feasibility.
17 See, eg., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), discussed infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 569.
18 See, eg., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (First Amendment); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (Fourth Amendment); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (Sixth
Amendment); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Seventh Amendment); Whitley v. Albers,
106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986) (Eighth Amendment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Fourteenth Amendment); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Commerce Clause); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (Contract Clause);
Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (Privileges and Immunities Clause); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Tenth Amendment); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (Separation of Powers).
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Part III combines the Madisonian paradigm and the evidentiary analogue to construct a detailed strategy for constitutional balancing. It
describes why Madisonian Balancing operates at the transactional level
of analysis. Instead of balancing specific rights against the aggregate of
government interests, as is now done, Madisonian Balancing includes the
aggregation of implicated rights in order to compare the full liberty concer affected by a government action against the government's reasons
for acting. Moreover, Part III explains how the procedural rules of the
burden of proof and presumptions help clarify and formalize the balancing method. Finally, this Part contrasts the utility and efficacy of Madisonian Balancing with the entire spectrum of traditional constitutional
methods and concludes that the spectrum should be replaced by the single method of Madisonian Balancing.
I.

THE MADISONIAN TRADITION AND BALANCING

Inherent in the Madisonian paradigm is the clash of values between
the majority's right to regulate and the individual's right to be free of
majoritarian control. To resolve this clash, the Court has used a variety
of methods, all of which fall upon a single spectrum. On one end stands
formalism; on the other, ad hoc balancing. The use of formalistic methods dominated the Court's early constitutional history. In the twentieth
century, balancing emerged as the constitutional method of choice. Balancing, however, has been criticized for failing to make any clearer than
formalism the basis for constitutional decisions. This Part briefly recounts the historical shift from formalism to balancing and closely examines the contemporary critique of that move.
A. HistoricalAntecedents
As an explicit constitutional methodology, balancing is of relatively
recent vintage. 19 However, balancing, as an implicit method, has long
stood at the core of jurisprudential thought. Indeed, the concept of the
"scales of justice" can be traced to ancient times. 20 Modern constitutional doctrine merely continues this balancing legacy. Indeed, the very
foundation of the Madisonian system appears to contemplate balancing
government power against the rights of individuals to be free of such
power. 21 The large number and variety of constitutional contexts that
19 See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 948.
20 See Frank N. Coffin, JudicialBalancing: The Protean Scales ofJustice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16,
19 (1988) (noting that Bulfinch describes Themis as "holding aloft a pair of scales, in which she
weighs the claims of opposing parties") (citation omitted).
21 1 am aware, of course, that saying that the Madisonian system contemplates this balance does
not compel, or even necessarily suggest, the conclusion that the judiciary should be the balancer.
But once we assume that the Court will enter the process and evaluate the constitutionality of the
actions of the more political branches, a role designated in Marbury v. Madison, then the Court must
account for the inherent character of the Madisonian paradigm. Indeed, as the guardian of the

HeinOnline -- 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 646 1993-1994

Madisonian Balancing

88:641 (1994)

merit balancing would seem to confirm the integral nature of the balancing method for constitutional interpretation. A brief glance back, however, belies this conclusion.
For much of the Court's history, the distribution of power between
the government and the individual was deemed to have an absolutist
character. 22 The government was empowered to operate in identifiable
spheres while others remained beyond its reach. In the nineteenth century, the Court sought to remain faithful to the perceived intrinsic character of the Constitution by identifying the limits of government power
through definition. The manifest core of the nineteenth-century methodology was a set of categories with which the Court attempted to demarcate the spheres of legitimate governmental activity. This method
reflected the formalism of the time.
Not surprisingly, many nineteenth-century cases can be viewed
through a modem lens as balancing cases. Our ability to interpret these
cases as balancing decisions is a result, not of the altered nature of the
clash between rights and interests, but of the change in our perception of
that clash. What led to this result? The briefest answer is also the simplest. The formalistic strategy employed in these early cases increasingly
strained against the categorical boundaries selected.
The Court's nineteenth-century experience interpreting the "negative implications" of the Commerce Clause provides an illuminating example. 23 The question presented is the scope of state power to regulate
matters that touch interstate commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden,24 Chief
Justice John Marshall drew the distinction between the states' legitimate
police powers and their lack of power over interstate commerce. 25 In
practice, however, the categories police and commerce proved unenlightening; they were merely conclusions that provided no explanation for the
results they achieved. 26 These categories were eventually replaced by
new categories fashioned in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.27 In Cooley, the
Court distinguished regulations that were inherently local and within the
system, the Court cannot avoid employing the system's implicit operating assumptions. If the model
contemplates striking a balance between majority will and individual liberty, the Court's role must
include holding the scales. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
22 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960

(1992).
23 The Commerce Clause states, in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25 See RUTH L. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STATE POLICE POWER 10
(1957); see also HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 27-31.
26 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE (1937). See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 406 (2d ed.

1988).
27 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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state's power from regulations that were so national in character that
uniform regulation was necessary. This categorization scheme wound up
being as unenlightening as the one framed in Gibbons and was similarly
28
abandoned.
Whether the categories were police/commerce or local/national,
formalistic analysis failed to provide sufficient explanation of the basis for
decision. As the Court increasingly realized, state regulations of commerce did not have inherent qualities that could be categorized. These
regulations were functions of intricate forces having complicated effects
on the nation's economy. 29 In an effort to account for this complexity,
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence embraced the balancing
method. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,30 for instance, the Court
evaluated whether the burden on interstate commerce was outweighed by
the state's interest in the regulation. Balancing, however, has increasingly come under attack for failing to make any clearer than formalism
the basis for decision and, possibly, creating more problems than it
solved.
B.

The Perils of Balancing

Critics of constitutional balancing decry the dangerous discretion
afforded the Court. Justice Black particularly loathed its carte blanche
potential. 31 Professor Henkin, a cautious admirer of balancing, summarized the critics' concern: "Its reasonableness and simplicity are seductive, the way it points is sometimes too easy, the answers it provides too
uncritical."' 32 Balancing seemingly permits judges enormous latitude in
measuring values and facts for inclusion on the scales while, at the same
time, purporting to be objective, neutral, and even scientific. Whereas
formalism offers little explanation for decisions, balancing offers exhaustive reasons that, some argue, obscure the result as fully as formalism.
The concern over the lack of checks on judicial balancers usually focuses
on three main issues. First, balancing decisions contain an "unrealistic
pretension to precision."' 33 Second, balancing requires measurement of
incommensurable factors on a common scale.34 Third, balancing invites
judges to second-guess legislative policy decisions and thereby assume a
28 See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 409; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 950-51; Henkin, supra
note 3, at 1038.
29 See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 29-30.
30 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945).
31 See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517, 528-33 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 164-67 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 67-71 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
32 Henkin, supra note 3, at 1047.
33 Coffin, supra note 20, at 20. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 992.
34 See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 972.
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legislative capacity themselves.3 5 Whatever the accuracy of these criticisms, abandoning balancing to return to formalism makes sense only if
balancing suffers these weaknesses to a greater degree than formalism.
This subpart evaluates the comparative worth of the balancing method
against the alternative of formalism. This juxtaposition leads to the conclusion that traditional balancing is, at least, no worse than traditional
formalism; Part III assumes the task of demonstrating the advantages
that a modified balancing scheme offers as a constitutional method.
1. A "Pretensionto Precision."--It is ironic that the principal criticism of balancing should be its false cloak of exactitude. In large measure, balancing arose as a pragmatic remedy to the failure of formalism
to realize its reputedly inherent certainty.3 6 Formalistic line-drawing
sought to cabin in an absolute manner the principles of the Constitution.
Only when judges realized the impossibility of locating the essential natures of constitutional issues did balancing arise to account for the ambiguity.3 7 Legal formalism was a product of a scientistic era; balancing
appealed to the minds of twentieth-century judges and scholars more accustomed to concepts of relativity, probability, and uncertainty.3 8 Formalism is to balancing what Newton is to Einstein.
Balancing decisions are ambitious creations in that they seek to integrate multifarious principles with a multitude of facts. Very often, however, the premises and support for the factors drawn together in the
balance are left unstated. The values used to calibrate the scales remain
vague while the Court heaps upon the scales principles and facts in unspecified amounts. The elements placed on the scales are put forth as
39
known quantities that must merely be measured in particular cases.
Professor Aleinikoff lamented this state of affairs:
Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of subjectivity,
make us spectators as the Court places the various interests on the scales.
The weighing mechanism remains a mystery, and the result is simply read
off the machine. Scientific balancing decisions are neither opinions nor ar35 Id. at 984.
Id. at 949-51.
See id. at 952-54 (offering a three-pronged reason-the political, judicial, and academic-for
this shift).
38 Justice Frankfurter's words reflect this modern mind set:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest
in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for
the non-Euclidean problems to be solved.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951).
39 Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the JudicialBalance: The Jurisprudenceof
Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 18-25 (1987).
36

37
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guments that can engage us; they are demonstrations. 4°
The error, according to Aleinikoff, is in the method. 4 1 The fairness of
this objection to balancing must be measured by evaluating the effectiveness of formalism in exposing the mysteries of constitutional interpretation. As it turns out, formalism also shrouds the decisionmaking
mechanism in mystery.
Formalism cloaks issues in certitude, hiding from the observer, if
not the observed, the true basis for the decision. 42 In Lochner v. New
York, 43 for example, Justice Peckham buried, or was ignorant of, the economic, social, and political factors that motivated his conclusion that
"[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part
of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution." 44 Underlying the seemingly straightforward categorization of contract into liberty lay the empirical assumptions surrounding Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.45 The constitutional
category of "liberty" does not inexorably extend to the freedom to contract.4 6 Placing the latter in the former's box without articulating the
principles and values guiding that conclusion mystifies constitutional adjudication no less than the current balancing practices. Whereas balancing often entails the announcement of vast numbers of principles that
combine to an inexplicable result, formalism often entails the announcement of a category without any principle that singularly leads to an inex47
plicable result.
Both formalism and balancing strategies thus seem to permit the
48
Of
obfuscation of the principles and facts integral to a conclusion.
40 Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 993.
41 Id.; see also Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 193 (1985).
42 Professor Schauer-a cautious admirer of formalism-noted this criticism:
[O]ne view of the vice of formalism takes that vice to be one of deception, either of oneself or of
others. To disguise a choice in the language of definitional inexorability obscures that choice
and thus obstructs questions of how it was made and whether it could have been made differently.
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513-14 (1988).

43 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44 Id. at 53.
45 Justice Holmes criticized the Court for constitutionalizing its world view:

This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further

and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46 See Schauer, supra note 42, at 511-13.
47 See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 821 ("Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men
ever are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's reason and betray him against himself.")

(quoting W.G. Summer).
48 Id. at 825; see Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV.427, 428-30
(1979); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersection Between
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course, that balancing allows as much deception as formalism hardly recommends it as a constitutional method. But critics' attacks on balancing
amount to an indictment of the users, not the method. The Court has
employed balancing with a formalistic certainty that perverts the elegance of the method. It is as if balancers wished to deny the uncertainty
of the constitutional enterprise; but balancing's strength derives from its
explicit recognition that God does, indeed, "play dice" with the universe. 49 The quintessence of balancing as a constitutional method is its
acceptance, indeed its celebration, of the uncertainty of values and facts
in the constitutional firmament. The question whether balancing can
provide a structure within which to comprehend this uncertainty is explored in Part III.
2. Lack of a Common Scale.-An often-repeated criticism of balancing is that the absence of a common scale by which to measure the
multifarious rights and interests that must be balanced renders the entire
enterprise chimerical. There are at least two versions of this criticism,
typically referred to as the "apples and oranges" complaint.5 0 The simplified version holds that rights and interests cannot be reduced to a single metric that would permit useful comparison. Reality undermines the
surface appeal of this argument; apples and oranges are often compared
on a common scale, such as weight, size, or subjective preference. Similarly, constitutional principles could be measured along a variety of unitary dimensions, such as efficiency, utilitarian cost/benefit ratios, and so
on. However objectionable it might seem, measuring constitutional principles on a unitary basis is theoretically easy to imagine. The prospect of
measuring constitutional cases along a single metric raises the more sophisticated version of the apples and oranges complaint: the absence of a
single scale of values external to judges' policy preferences.5 1 In this version of the apples and oranges complaint, the concern is disagreement
over what metric to adopt, not the inability to locate a single scale.
While the development of a single metric scale is theoretically straightforward, no particular metric appears constitutionally mandated or
otherwise neutral.
This criticism, like the pretension of precision, afflicts all constitutional methods. Balancing cannot be faulted for failing to solve the puzzle that has preoccupied constitutional scholarship in the late twentieth
Law and PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 236-41 (1968); Grant Gilmore, Law, Logic and
Experience, 3 How. L.J. 26, 37-38 (1957); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution As an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 n.29 (1934).
49 This phrase alludes to Albert Einstein's famous comment concerning the import of such theories as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which indicate that the very nature of some events is
probabilistic. See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 56 (1988). Despite Einstein's disbelief, the principle of uncertainty forms one of the cornerstones of modem physics.
50 Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 972.
51 Id. at 973; Frantz, supra note 4, at 1440.
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century-the search for neutral principles.5 2 The success of this search,
and indeed the value of the excursion, are questions that transcend the
balancing method. Criticizing balancing for failing to identify neutral
principles confuses the substantive problem of value identification in constitutional interpretation with the process problem of integrating some
identified values into factual contexts for purposes of adjudication. Balancing does not substitute for classic constitutional construction. The
identity, nature, or even existence of principles, neutral or otherwise,
must be ascertained separately from the balancing mechanism. The
scales of justice merely provide a heuristic metaphor; the principles inherent in the Constitution give content to the metaphor.
Understanding the balancing method as insisting on a single quantitative scale over-literalizes the metaphor.5 3 The constitutional balance
need not speak in quantifiable units at all. Indeed, how could it? Most of
the factors placed upon the scales are not quantifiable in any real sense.
Constitutional factors such as deprivation of liberty, administrative necessity, expectations of privacy, exigent circumstances, value of speech,
perpetuation of moral order, and so on, have no specific quantifiable
referent.5 4 (What price liberty?) So we should not expect our constitutional methodology to be able to measure them in strict quantifiable
terms.
Although constitutional values do not lend themselves to a simple
calculus, they are amenable to comparison and rough measurement on a
single scale. To anticipate briefly the discussion of Part III, the single
balancing metric is simply the nonquantifiable value of "constitutionality." To be sure, it is neither objective nor scientific; but it is measurable.
For instance, we might not be able to say that one statute is "twice" as
constitutional as another; but it is commonplace to refer to one statute as
more constitutional than another.5 5 Although, in this sense, the conclu52 See Herbert A. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.

1, 16-17 (1959).
53 See Coffin, supra note 20, at 20-21 (cautioning against taking the balancing metaphor too
seriously).
54 Although most constitutional factors cannot be reduced fully to quantifiable terms, many are
defined in ways that permit quantification at least in part. For example, even if deprivations of
liberty have an obvious subjective component, the length of the deprivation can be measured directly. The Court has struggled with the relevance of this issue in deciding the standard for reviewing proportionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In fact, it is difficult to identify a constitutional issue
that does not have some empirical component that, at least in theory, is measurable. See Faigman,
supra note 2, at 607.
55 While constitutionality is not strictly quantifiable, this construct can be conceived as lying
upon a scale of measurement. The qualitative nature of the term does not prevent judgments that
some state regulation is more or less constitutional than some other, despite our inability to say how
much more or less. In mathematical terms, balancing uses an ordinal scale to measure constitutionality rather than a cardinal scale or a ratio scale. A ratio scale has a true zero, a fact which permits
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sion derived through balancing lies on a single scale-constitutionalitymyriad factors comprise this outcome. It is these factors that Madisonian Balancing draws in greater relief. The metric of constitutionality is

particularly important to Madisonian Balancing, for the Madisonian balance is struck at the Constitution-wide level. On one scale is placed the
full liberty concern and on the other is placed the government's reasons
for infringing that liberty. The result is measured in constitutional units.
3. Judges as Legislators.-The final criticism of balancing objects

that this method transforms judges into legislators. 5 6 Complaints of a
legislative judiciary are at least as old as judicial review itself and thus

cannot, in their simplest version, be associated uniquely with balancing.
The sophisticated version of this complaint, however, is not limited to
balancing judges usurping the power of the political branches, but instead holds that the balancing method resembles too closely the method

used by legislators. This view posits that the process of micro-weighing
the costs and benefits to segments of society is a legislative task that the
Court illegitimately duplicates when using a constitutional balancing
methodology.5 7 The obverse of this point, of course, is that legislators do
not reason formalistically, so that when judges do so they reason differ-

ently than legislators.
The belief that legislators do not think formalistically is so obviously
erroneous that it almost needs no discussion. It might be said, however,

that a legislator's formalism is different in kind than a judge's. A legislator constructs rules relying on sundry political factors that go beyond the
legitimate purview of judges. A legislator's formalism is built on a political foundation of special interests and unarticulated premises unavailable to judges. Hence, a legislator's formalistic thinking, though it
resembles a judge's, differs fundamentally by virtue of the premises used
comparisons such as "twice as much." A cardinal scale has no true zero, but the points of measurement are the same distance apart along the scale. An ordinal scale is numerically calibrated, but
only for purposes of ordering some construct from highest to lowest. The Fahrenheit scale is an
example of a cardinal scale; it has no true zero, so it would be incorrect to say that 100 degrees is
twice as hot as 50 degrees. The Kelvin scale, in contrast, does contain a true zero and thus, as do all
ratio scales, permits such comparisons. Minerals can be ordered in terms of their relative hardness
along Mohs's scale, an ordinal scale with "I" representing the softest mineral (Le., tale) and "10" the
hardest (Le., diamond). The ordinal scale does not indicate how much harder one mineral is than
another, just their order of hardness. N.M. DOWNIE & R.W. HEATH, BASIC STATISTICAL METHODS 7 (5th ed. 1983). Government actions might similarly be measurable on an ordinal scale of
constitutionality.
56 See, eg., Kahn, supra note 39, at 5.
57 Professor Woolhandler makes this argument:
Formalizing the process for judicial reception of legislative facts will increase the hegemony of
pragmatic balancing at the expense of other processes of judicial reasoning. Increasing the
influence of pragmatic balancing in judicial decisionmaking will make the judicial process look
more like the legislative and administrative processes, and will undermine the legitimacy of the
courts.

Woolhandler, supra note 2, at 121.
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to support it. This is a persuasive argument as regards formalism; as it
turns out, it is also persuasive as regards balancing.
To be sure, the balancing process evident in many constitutional decisions bears a close resemblance to legislative balancing. The premises
that support that balancing, however, differ (or should differ) from those
relied upon by legislators. For instance, consider a proposed law to impose a fifteen-day waiting period on all gun sales.5 8 A legislator considering whether to vote in favor of the law is likely to balance a host of
factors, including the scope of any constitutional right to bear arms in
the Second Amendment, the effectiveness of the waiting period in keeping guns out of the hands of certain classes of people, the likely response
of the N.R.A. at the next election, how the press will portray the vote
back home, and so on. The legislator probably will weigh these factors in
an unarticulated jumble and come to some defensible result, at least to
her constituents. A court reviewing the constitutionality of this law will
likely review some of the very same factors as the legislator. The court
will not review all of the same factors, however, nor will it review them
in the same manner.
Assuming a constitutional right to bear arms exists that is sufficient
to support judicial scrutiny of the fifteen-day waiting period, 59 the court
will evaluate this law very differently, even if it uses much of the same
language. Obviously, like the legislature, the court will first consider the
nature of the Second Amendment right. This is not surprising, since
both the legislator and judge are sworn to uphold the Constitution. For
the judge, this threshold determination has more significance than for the
legislator. If the Second Amendment is implicated, but not deeply so,
the balancing judge defers greatly to the legislative judgment. Some balancing occurs, but the undifferentiated weight of the democratic process
requires the judge to accept uncritically the legislature's reasons for passing the law. Thus, the balancing court merely peers over the shoulder of
the balancing legislature to ensure that the scales are not defective. In
contrast, if the Second Amendment were deeply implicated, the balancing court would reweigh the factors a legislature could legitimately rely
upon in order to ensure the accuracy of the result. Under such circumstances, the judge owes the legislator little or no deference.
Yet, even when the court steps up to the scales to weigh independently the right to bear arms against the government's interest in the
waiting period, judicial balancing differs from legislative balancing. The
legislator's choice of factors to place on the scales extends far wider than
the court's. 60 A court is constrained in balancing by placing on the rights
58 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(3)(A) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (misdemeanor for a
dealer to deliver a firearm within 15 days of the application for purchase).
59 See Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
60 See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in ConstitutionalLaw (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 51 (1992) ("[Iln most well-functioning legal
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side of the equation only items mandated by the Constitution, however
loosely conceived. And on the opposing scale, the court is limited to
measuring the nature of the interests and the effectiveness of the means
chosen to meet those interests, as posited by the government. 61 In assessing the weight of the implicated right, the court owes no deference to the
legislature. 62 In reviewing the magnitude of the interest and the effectiveness of the action, the court relies on, but checks, the legislature's judgments, and in reading the result off the scales, the court is
constitutionally obligated to exercise independent judgment. The judicial
and legislative processes thus bear much resemblance, but the content,
nature, and scope of the enterprise differ significantly.
The traditional criticisms of constitutional balancing thus take aim
first at the lack of guidance it gives to judges and, second, at the perceived license it gives them to fill the Constitution with their idiosyncratic value choices. Balancing's weakness, then, lies in its seemingly
inherent lack of structure, an absence that allegedly inhibits constitutional debate. The remainder of this Article is devoted to proposing a
constitutional balancing scheme with a structure that satisfies balancing's
critics, a composition that significantly enhances constitutional debate.
Two essential components comprise all constitutional debates: constitutional values and constitutional facts. Madisonian Balancing seeks to
draw both in fuller detail. The next Part offers a context in which to
understand constitutional facts, the great forgotten component of constitutional adjudication.
II.

INTEGRATING FACTS AND VALUES IN THE TRADITION OF THE
COMMON LAW

Although fact finding commands a central position in constitutional
adjudication, it occupies a remarkably small region of constitutional
scholarship. Moreover, the Court manifests little understanding of, or
regard for, the significance of fact finding to constitutional decisions.
This neglect has resulted in inconsistency and incoherence in constitutional jurisprudence. 63 Since the principal object of Madisonian Balancing is to integrate constitutional facts with constitutional values, this
Part, as a preliminary step, briefly describes the kinds of facts that arise
systems, judges cannot consider factors that are properly part of the day-to-day work of administrators and legislators.").
61 Note that under rational basis review, the Court will sometimes provide a legitimate purpose
when the government has failed to anticipate one.
62 But see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 34-37 (1962).

Para-

phrasing and agreeing with James Bradley Thayer, Bickel observed: "[E]very action of the other
departments embodies an implicit decision on their part that it was within their constitutional power
to act as they did. The judiciary must accord the utmost respect to this determination, even though
it be a tacit one." Id. at 35.
63 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1579-80.
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in constitutional cases. The second subpart of this Part presents a primer
on the evidentiary principles of burden of proof and presumption, principles that provide the essential insights to the integration of constitutional
value and constitutional fact.
A.

The Configuration of Facts

Professor Kenneth Culp Davis provided the classic dichotomy between two types of legal facts, what he referred to as adjudicative facts
and legislative facts. 64 Adjudicative facts are facts particular to a dispute
and are within the province of the trier of fact (the jury, or if there is no
jury, the judge) to decide. Evidence rules were specifically designed to
manage adjudicative facts. Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those
facts that transcend the particular dispute and have relevance to legal
reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules; judges are responsible for
deciding questions of legislative fact. In contrast to adjudicative facts,
the rules of evidence expressly do not apply to legislative facts. 65 This
Article proposes to extend certain aspects of evidence doctrine to the
66
enterprise of finding some kinds of legislative facts.
Before making this argument, I must further refine Davis's legislative fact category into two subcategories, what I call constitutional-rule
facts and constitutional-reviewfacts. 67 Constitutional-rule facts are advanced to substantiate a particular interpretation of the Constitution.
Constitutional-rule facts belong to the traditional sources of authoritythe text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and contemporary values-in establishing the meaning of the Constitution. Constitutional-rule facts, therefore, serve as authority supporting the Court's
construction of the text. A straightforward example of a constitutionalrule fact can be found in Gibbons v. Ogden.68 Chief Justice Marshall
asserted that "[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly understood,
the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. ' 69 Assuming the seriousness of this observation, at least as to America's current understand64 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the AdministrativeProcess,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
65 See FED. R. EviD. 201(a) ("This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.");
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note ("No rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative
facts.' ").

66 At the outset, I must alert the reader that this proposal has been rejected by several distinguished scholars. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis found rules of evidence "wholly inappropriate for
legislative facts." Davis, supra note 64, at 403. More significantly, my former mentors, Professors
John Monahan and Laurens Walker, have questioned the usefulness of the evidentiary analogy:
"Clearly, an answer to the question of how courts are to deal with unsupported empirical assertions
underlying a legal rule is not to be found by analogy with the procedures used to analyze unsupported social [Le., adjudicative] facts." Monahan & Walker, supra note 17, at 577. It remains to be
seen whether the student can persuade the teachers that the situation is less clear than they presume.
67 See Faigman, supra note 2, at 551-56.
68 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
69 Id. at 190.
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ing, this factual observation is eminently testable. The history of the
Constitution is replete with examples of constitutional-rule facts that
70
have contributed to the meaning of that document.
Constitutional-review facts, on the other hand, refer to facts that the
Court must review under a pertinent constitutional rule in order to determine the constitutionality of the state's action. Constitutional-review
facts are the most prevalent sort of constitutional fact and the type usually associated with fact finding in constitutional adjudication. The recent case of Barnes v. Glen Theatre7 provides an apt illustration.
Petitioner challenged an Indiana law barring public nudity as applied to
nude dancing in the petitioner's club. The Court found that nude dancing was expressive conduct and thus "within the outer perimeters of the
First Amendment, though.., only marginally so. ''72 An issue raised by
this interpretation concerned the government's justification for its infringement of speech, whatever the depth of the right. Justice Souter,
concurring, provided the factual justification for the government's action:
"the statute is applied to nude dancing because such dancing 'encourag[es] prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other
criminal activity.' ",73 Because the First Amendment was implicated, the
government's basis for acting became relevant. The connection between
nude dancing and prostitution, sexual assaults, and general criminal activity were constitutional facts reviewable under the authority vested in
the Court through the First Amendment.
It should be noted, finally, that constitutional cases often involve
adjudicative facts-facts peculiar to the dispute and which must be examined under the pertinent constitutional rule. A clear example of constitutional-adjudicative facts can be found in the obscenity cases. Under
the Miller test, juries determine whether particular materials are patently
offensive or appeal to the prurient interest under local community
standards. 74
70 See, eg., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (setting the constitutional floor for jury
size at six on the basis of empirical research on jury functioning with fewer than twelve members);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (basing the parameters of the right of reproductive choice on
medical technology); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (basing a constitutional
right to integrated schooling on the empirical fact that separate schools were not equal); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (assuming equality of bargaining power between employer and
employee as support for constitutional protection of liberty of contract); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (implicitly assuming that legislators would be less faithful to a written
Constitution than judges as support for judicial review). For a more expansive discussion of these
and other cases, see Faigman, supra note 2, at 556-64.
71 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
72 Id. at 2460.

73 Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37, Barnes (No. 90-26)).
74 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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B. Burdens of Proofand Presumptions: An Evidentiary Primer
The relevance of particular facts in the trial process depends on the
provisions of the applicable substantive law. Whether the defendant had
notice of a banana peel on the floor might be relevant in a negligence
action but irrelevant in an action under a workers' compensation statute.
The substantive law provides a normative framework within which to
organize, understand, and evaluate facts. In many cases, parties to both
civil and criminal actions assume responsibility for demonstrating the
existence or nonexistence of certain facts. For instance, a plaintiff might
have the responsibility to prove the defendant's negligence while the defendant might bear the responsibility to demonstrate the plaintiff's contributory negligence. In criminal actions, the state bears most of the
responsibility for proving facts, though defendants frequently are responsible for some factual matters. 75 In order to control the course of proof
in the trial process, courts employ procedural mechanisms that situate
responsibility for coming forward with proof and designate the quantum
of proof necessary to satisfy this responsibility. These procedural devices, in fact, reflect substantive policy choices regarding where the risk
of error should lie upon completion of the very uncertain business of fact
finding. The two devices used to allocate the risks of factual error are the
burden of proof and the presumption.
1. Burden of Proof-The somewhat ambiguous concept of the
burden of proof actually comprises two separate terms: the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. Both are important to Madisonian Balancing. The burden of production refers to the placement of
the initial burden on one of the parties to bring forward evidence sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the pertinent fact is
true. In civil cases, the party desiring to change the status quo normally
bears the production burden, though this allocation may be reversed in
order to effectuate some substantive policy. In criminal cases, the state
nearly always bears the initial burden to come forward with sufficient
evidence. 76 The production burden thus refers to the judge's responsibility to measure the evidence to ensure that it is sufficient to permit the
trier of fact to decide the matter.
In contrast, the burden of persuasion refers to the confidence that
the triers of fact must evince in their conclusion. The bearer of the burden of persuasion is ordinarily the same as that of the burden of produc75 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (statute placing burden of proof on issue
of incompetency to stand trial in criminal case upon defendant did not violate procedural due process); Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (Ohio practice of imposing on defendant the burden of
proving self-defense did not violate due process).
76 In criminal cases the defendant will often bear the burden to produce evidence sufficient to
demonstrate an affirmative defense such as self-defense or incompetence to stand trial. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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tion; the plaintiff usually assumes it in civil cases and the prosecution
bears it in criminal cases. After all the evidence has been introduced, the
trier of fact reaches a conclusion based on a standard of confidence, Le., a
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. This spectrum, ranging from a tie-breaking
standard to a standard as near certainty as possible, reflects the system's
judgment of the consequences flowing from factual error. In most civil
cases, the preponderance standard illustrates the system's indifference in
the allocation of error between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants; but
some tie-breaking mechanism is needed in these cases, and by custom the
law has favored the status quo. 7 7 In contrast, the stringent beyond a
reasonable doubt standard illustrates the strong systemic preference
favoring the defendant when mistakes are made. Thus the well-known
colloquialism: It is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict
78
one innocent man.
2. Presumptions.-A second and important concept usefully borrowed from the common law of evidence is the presumption. Although a
variety of evidentiary devices are labeled as presumptions, the only true
presumption is the "rebuttable presumption. ' 79 Two forms of the rebuttable presumption exist: one shifts the burden of production, and the
other shifts the burden of persuasion. The following discussion is limited
to the two forms of the rebuttable presumption, what I refer to as the
production-shifting and persuasion-shifting presumptions. These two
forms of the presumption function similarly, though with quite different
effects.
The basic principle behind the presumption is that proof of a basic
fact or facts compels acceptance of a presumed fact unless the opponent
demonstrates by some quantum of proof that the presumed fact is otherwise. 80 The production-shifting presumption provides that once the beneficiary of the presumption demonstrates the basic fact, the opponent
bears the burden of producing some evidence disputing the presumed
fact. The beneficiary of the production-shifting presumption, however,
continues to bear the risk of nonpersuasion on the merits. In contrast,
once the beneficiary of a persuasion-shifting presumption demonstrates
77 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 574-75 (John

W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
78 See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 460 (1989).
79 MCCORMICK, supra note 77, § 342, at 578-79. Two other devices regularly labeled as presumptions are the permissive, or standardized, inference and the conclusive presumption. The former merely denotes a logical relationship between facts, such that knowing one fact increases the
likelihood that another fact is true. The latter is a substantive rule of law whereby proof of one fact
compels acceptance of a second fact; no amount of proof will suffice to rebut the presumed fact.
80 See, eg., FED. R. EvID. 301 ("[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.").
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the basic fact(s), the opponent bears both the burden to produce evidence
and the risk of nonpersuasion on the merits.
A typical legislatively created presumption, one that could be interpreted to shift either the production burden or the persuasion burden,
will illustrate the mechanics of presumptions. The California legislature
enacted the following presumption:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if...
(1) ... the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after
the marriage is terminated .... 81
If this presumption shifts the burden of production, once the mother introduces sufficient evidence 2 to prove the basic fact of birth during the
marriage or within three hundred days after the marriage was terminated, the alleged father must produce sufficient evidence disputing the
presumed fact of paternity. If the alleged father is successful in producing this proof, the burden shifts back to the mother who now bears the
burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of paternity. If this presumption shifts the burden of persuasion, however, once the mother produces
sufficient evidence of the basic fact, the alleged father assumes the burdens of production and persuasion to disprove the presumed fact.
The insights into integrating facts and values provided by the experience of the common law of evidence lend considerable clarity to the constitutional context. The next Part borrows many of these insights to
construct a new way of conducting constitutional adjudication.
III.

REPLACING THE SPECTRUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL METHODS
WITH MADISONIAN BALANCING

Madisonian Balancing is a balancing process that explicitly incorporates burdens of proof and the insights of presumptions in order to allocate the responsibility between the parties to articulate and demonstrate
both the principles and facts necessary to constitutional adjudication.
Moreover, Madisonian Balancing assesses constitutional liberty against
government interests on a transactional basis. Madisonian Balancing incorporates evidentiary constructs in order to assign responsibility for
identifying and defining constitutional values and for finding and substantiating constitutional facts. This process embraces a formalistic element in that the categories implicated in particular cases initially
establish the respective burdens of proof. This formalistic element provides guidance to the discretion incorporated into the constitutional text.
Its use allows Madisonian Balancing to refrain from the free-for-all assessment of the social or economic good while avoiding the rigidity of
81 CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 7004 (West Supp. 1993).

82 "Sufficient evidence" refers to the proof necessary such that a reasonable trier of fact could

find that the alleged father was married to the mother and that the child was born during the marriage or within ten months of its termination.
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categorical analysis; it allows a process of guided discretion. The categories of Madisonian Balancing are not right specific, however, and instead
query the depth of the liberty concern infringed by the government action. The Madisonian balancer seeks to compare the full impact on liberty of a government action and weigh it against the justification for that
action. This process requires a balancing court to aggregate rights.
A.

Introduction: The Elements of Madisonian Balancing

This subpart explicates the essential components of the present proposal to reorient constitutional adjudication. Madisonian Balancing
would alter conventional constitutional decisionmaking in two basic
ways. First, it would shift the perspective of the balancer from an
amendment-specific to a Constitution-wide focus. The balance would
continue to be rights based, but the constitutional infringement would be
measured on a transactional basis. The second core aspect of Madisonian Balancing is the incorporation of evidentiary concepts into constitutional adjudication in order to make plain the premises of
constitutional argument.
L Aggregating Rights: A TransactionalApproach to Balancing.Current balancing methods are right specific. This means that constitutional analysis involves, first, an itemization of the parts of the document
that have been infringed, second, an assessment of the nature and scope
of the respective infringements, and, finally, an individual balancing of
each right against the interests that justify the government action. In
practice, therefore, the Court routinely balances the same government
interests against more than one right. In Bell v. Wolfish, 83 for example,
the government justified its publisher-only rule, which prohibited inmates from receiving hardcover books that are not mailed directly from
publishers, with its need to prevent contraband from entering the prison.
The Court recognized that the publisher-only rule implicated both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. In separate sections of its opinion,
the Court found that the government's security need outweighed the
prisoners' First Amendment right and that the government's security
need outweighed the prisoners' right not to be deprived of their property
without due process of law.
Depending on how this practice is viewed, right-specific balancing
tends either to undervalue the Constitution's guarantee of liberty or to
double count the government's justification for infringing that liberty.
84
For example, suppose that in Wolfish, if such things could be measured,
83 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
84 Although for purposes of illustration in this Part I give specific weights to constitutional
rights and government interests, I cannot emphasize too strongly that I do not believe constitutional
analysis permits quantification of values. Once again, this is not to say that rights cannot be measured; they can be--on an ordinal scale of measurement. See supra note 55.
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the First Amendment right implicated weighs four constitutional units
and the due process property right also weighs four constitutional units.
And suppose further that the government's interest in Wolfish could be
quantified at six constitutional units. By dividing the rights and weighing
them separately against the government interest, the government's action
passes scrutiny under conventional balancing. If the full weight of the
constitutional infringement is assessed against the government action,
however, the action would be deemed unconstitutional. The latter approach seems more consistent with the values, structure, and, indeed,
common understanding of the Constitution.
The concept of aggregation already informs the calculation of the
weight of government interests in conventional balancing tests. The
Court assesses government interests on a transactional basis. The Court
first describes the form of government action and, thereafter, explores the
objectives that do (or might) support that action. Only then does the
Court begin to disassemble the constitutional costs associated with the
action by individually tallying the weight of the various rights implicated. If balancing is the constitutional method of choice, it is manifest
error to aggregate the values on one side of the scales but not on the
other.
Moreover, from the individual victim's perspective, the depth of a
constitutional infringement does not depend on the specific source of the
right. As long as the constitutional values implicated do not overlap, the
infringement of one right, in fact, adds to the injury caused by the infringement of other rights. Returning to Wolfish, the prisoners suffer a
greater constitutional injury when they are deprived of property that not
only implicates their due process rights but also falls within the scope of
the First Amendment. Depriving prisoners of books inflicts a greater
constitutional injury than, say, depriving them of hobby sets. The government's justification should have to outweigh the full import of the
infringement. To be sure, certain specific constitutional values can be
found implicit in both the First and Fourteenth Amendments and, so,
double counting must be avoided when aggregating rights. Madisonian
Balancing does not anticipate conducting a simple amendment count
when measuring constitutional rights. Madisonian Balancing requires an
exhaustive and full evaluation of the depth and nature of the rights and
interests on both sides of the scales.
In fact, the need to account for multiple rights when calculating the
constitutional balance has been recognized in various constitutional contexts. The most notorious of these is Griswold v. Connecticut,8 5 in which
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, identified the right of privacy as
situated in the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
85 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Amendments. 86 Of course, the Court and commentators alike have criticized Griswold's unorthodox approach. But the error of Griswold did not
lay in its aggregation of rights but, rather, in its failure to demonstrate
that privacy could actually be found somewhere in the document. The
criticism of privacy is that it does not exist in any amendment, not that it
is illegitimate to locate it in several.
The concept of aggregating rights has influenced the Court's analysis in other contexts. In Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 7 for example, Justice Scalia expressly embraced the
lesson that the nature of the Court's review changes when government
action infringes more than one right: "The only decisions in which we
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of
the press." 88 Justice Scalia, however, was criticized by the other Justices
for creating such a "hybrid" right,8 9 and the Court consistently insists on
segregating rights for purposes of analysis.
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the Court has never specifically explained its failure to aggregate rights, even in cases where it would seem
necessary to do so. A classic example of this comes from Ross v. Moffitt.90 In Ross, the respondent claimed that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated appointment of counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applications for
review in the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court observed
that the two bases "each depend[ ] on a different inquiry which emphasizes different factors." The Court explained the differences as follows
and proceeded to consider the claims separately without explanation:
"Due process" emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual
dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. "Equal protection," on the other hand, emphasizes
disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable. We will address these issues separately
in the succeeding sections. 9 1
The Court failed to contemplate the possibility that due process and
equal protection might combine in a single context to require a different
result than what might be reached if evaluated separately.
In fact, much of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is consistent with aggregating rights. For instance, implicit in the Court's selec86 Id. at 484.
87 494 U.S. 871 (1990); see infra notes 121-45 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
Smith.
88 494 U.S. at 881.
89 Id. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90 417 U.S. 600 (1973).
91 Id. at 609.
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tive incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process lies the insight that drives the present proposal:
liberty has content that transcends the specific categories of the Bill of
Rights. As Justice Cardozo emphasized in Palko v. Connecticut,92 determining that certain rights are incorporated "has been dictated by a study
and appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself."' 93 Despite our traditional myopia otherwise, liberty resists being
cabined into discrete categories. The guiding principle of the incorporation doctrine itself contemplates a broader understanding: those rights
are incorporated when they "have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'94 This test requires the interpreter to transcend
a crabbed, compartmentalized view of the Bill of Rights. We know, not
from any reading of the text, that free speech is a fundamental right but
the right to a jury in a civil trial is not; yet the text of the Constitution
states both rights equally emphatically. The content of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights comes from interpretations that transcend the
document's specific words.
The fundamental lesson of the Bill of Rights is that liberty is really
just one freedom, a freedom that is defined in various operational ways in
that document. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment, whatever its substantive
content, emphasizes how the blanket of liberty is woven from a single
thread. Professor Randy Barnett described how the Ninth Amendment
contains this very lesson: "Liberty rights define a boundary within which
individuals and associations are free to do as they wish. Because the
ways by which this liberty can be exercised are unlimited, it is impossible
to enumerate specific rights that people possess."' 95 Liberty has a richness, complexity, and multiplicity that resists simple compartmentalization or specific enumeration. It is expansive and must be compared with
the equally expansive concept of government interests. The process of
aggregating rights merely asks the ultimate constitutional question: what
degree of liberty is infringed by the challenged government action?
Madisonian Balancing requires that the government's purposes be measured against the individual's full liberty right.
2. Integrating Evidentiary Procedural Rules into the Madisonian
Paradigm.-Madisonian Balancing is informed by the relatively simple
premise that constitutional questions boil down to a choice between individual liberty and government interests. If these questions are not to
become bald assertions of political preference or simply follow the ideological idiosyncracies of judges, the balancing method that reconciles lib92 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
93 Id. at 326.
94 Id. at 325.

95 Randy Barnett, Foreward: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 626 (1991).
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erty and government interests must be guided by some rules derived from
general principles. The evidentiary concepts of burden of proof and presumptions provide such rules when they are informed by the Madisonian
96
model.
The Madisonian model, as previously noted, comprises two fundamental principles that inform American constitutional democracy, two
principles that stand in irreconcilable conflict. The first principle, the
majoritarian principle, embraces the core conception of democracy that
majorities rule. The second principle, the rights principle, marks certain
spheres of human relations as outside majoritarian control. Over time, if
not from the start, these two principles have not been deemed equally
fundamental. 97 The majoritarian principle predominates over the rights
principle. 98 This privileging of one principle over the other opens the
way for a procedural mechanism that can regulate these two principles
when they collide. Indeed, some strategy is needed, for a mechanism
must be available to break ties when the two principles are equally at
stake. The evidentiary analogue provides courts with an effective instrument to keep inviolate the two fundamental Madisonian principles as
they move through the labyrinth of constitutional adjudication.
The intuitive connection between the constructs of the burden of
proof and presumption and the Madisonian model is simple and direct.
Because the Madisonian model slightly privileges majoritarian will at the
systemic level, the initial burden of production falls upon the challenger
of the majoritarian action. The challenger's burden of production has
two components: the challenger must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of
a reasonable court, (1) that the government action infringed some constitutional liberty; and (2) the nature and scope of that liberty concern.
Once the challenger has met this production burden, the burden should
shift to the state to justify the infringement. Whether this shift switches
the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of production depends on
the nature of the constitutional liberty infringed. The government's burden has two components: the government must show (1) the legitimacy
96 Use of shifting burdens of proof is by no means a novel concept in areas outside the commonlaw trial context. It is used as a standard device to allocate responsibility under the civil rights laws.
See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. 1992) (originally enacted as § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). More importantly for the present thesis, perhaps, the essential insight of shifting burdens of
proof informs constitutional adjudication under the Canadian Constitution. See Calvin R. Massey,
Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the FoundationalParadigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 103, 187-95 (1992).
97 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61

(1989).

98 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 16 (1991) ("The Constitution puts democracy
first."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 (1980) ("[Mlajoritarian democracy is...
the core of our entire [system]."); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1980) ("[In] this nation's constitutional development from its origin to the
present time, majority rule has been considered the keystone of a democratic political system in both
theory and practice.").
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and strength of its interest; and (2) the factual nexus between the government's interest and the action taken to achieve that interest.
The evidentiary analogy supplies constitutional analysis with an array of standards by which to measure constitutional liberty and government interests when they conflict. Once the challenger has met her
burden of production showing that the government action implicates the
Constitution, the allocation of the burden of proof and its strength depend on the nature and scope of the liberty concern. I propose four
levels at which the challenger might demonstrate that the Constitution
has been infringed: (1) marginally; (2) consequentially; (3) centrally; and
(4) at its core. Infringements on the constitutional margins shift only the
burden of production while those that are consequential, central, or at
the core also shift the burden of persuasion, albeit at different standards.
Infringements on the Constitution's marginsshift the burden of production to the state to explain how its action is related to a legitimate
interest. Unlike under the current rational basis test, the state truly bears
the responsibility to articulate a legitimate interest as well as the nexus
between its action and this objective. 9 9 The challenger, however, bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion to refute the legitimacy of the interest
or, by empirical proof, the nexus between the interest and action. The
challenger bears the burden of persuasion, after the government meets its
burden of production, to show that the liberty concern more likely than
not outweighs the government's justification.
The three remaining categories of constitutional liberty shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to the government. Once the challenger
demonstrates the existence of a consequential liberty concern, the state
must demonstrate that the weight of the interest, and the factual nexus
between its action and that objective, more likely than not outweigh the
liberty concern. When a central liberty concern is infringed, the state
must show that its interest, and the factual nexus between its action and
that objective, clearly and convincingly outweigh the liberty concern. Finally, when a core liberty concern is infringed, the government is required
to show that its interest and the factual nexus between its action and that
objective outweigh the liberty concern beyond a reasonable doubt.
Madisonian Balancing alters the focus of the balancing metaphor in
important respects. Traditional balancing tests call upon courts, in a
rather vague fashion, to compare the strength of the government's interest to the depth of a specific constitutional right. The tests, however, do
not provide any mechanism by which this can be accomplished, nor do
they account for the factual components inherent in the analysis. Madisonian Balancing clarifies and specifies the elements of the test. First,
what is the nature and scope of the full constitutional infringement? Sec99 See infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the current
rational basis test and the Madisonian Balancing alternative).
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ond, when evaluating the strength of the government justification, with
what degree of certainty do we know that the government's action
achieves the articulated objective? Madisonian Balancing incorporates
the common sense idea that the weight of facts must be discounted by the
risk that they are false. For instance, the deterrent effect of capital punishment, as a government justification, gains weight the more confident
we are that such a connection exists. Within the tiers of Madisonian
Balancing, the Court must assess the importance of the government interest as well as the likelihood that the action truly accomplishes that
interest. Together, the answers to these two inquiries establish the
weight of the government justification for balancing purposes. 10 0
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan'0 ' provides a straightforward example of the explanatory value of the evidentiary procedural
rules when a single constitutional right is involved. In Hogan, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, invalidated Mississippi statutes that
limited enrollment in the Mississippi University for Women School of

Nursing to women. 102 Although Justice O'Connor did not describe her

interpretive method as incorporating shifting burdens, it reflects such an

implicit understanding.
Initially, Mr. Hogan, the challenger of state action, assumed the
burden to establish that the Equal Protection Clause applied to discrimination against men and did so to the same degree as it did to discrimination against women. Based upon the Court's precedents, the challenger
had little difficulty establishing that gender-based discrimination against
100 Although this Article develops the concept of Madisonian Balancing in the context of the
clash between individual rights and government interests, it can be employed in other constitutional
contexts in which balancing is used. In Dormant Commerce Clause cases, for instance, the Court
balances the state's interest in health and safety against the burden the legislation puts on interstate
commerce. Just as in the Eighth Amendment context, the weight of the state's justification depends
on how confidently we know the facts on which it is based.
Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), provides a useful example.
Iowa passed a law banning the use of 65-foot double tractor trailers on its highways. Iowa claimed,
among other things, that the justification for the rule was that longer trailers would increase the
number of deaths on Iowa roads. The truck company argued first that the larger trucks were at least
as safe as the smaller ones and, moreover, that the reloading and rerouting necessitated by the Iowa
law would burden interstate commerce by leading to more accidents and deaths on the highways
surrounding Iowa. Conducting a straightforward balance between the deaths claimed to be saved by
the Iowa law versus the deaths claimed to be caused by the Iowa law, we must have some idea how
sure we are of the respective sides' data. If Iowa alleges that its law avoids 100 deaths a year, with
25% confidence, and the truck company's data indicates the law will cause 50 deaths, with 90%
confidence, the interstate burden is greater than the benefit to the state: expected benefit = avoidance of 25 deaths; expected burden = 45 deaths outside Iowa. The weight of the state interest
depends not simply on the interest alleged, avoidance of 100 highway deaths a year, but also on how
confident the Court is that the law will achieve this purpose. Contrary to ordinary practice, it is
simply impossible to measure the weight of an interest underlying a government action without
knowing the factual likelihood that the action will achieve the asserted interest.
101 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
102 Id. at 733.
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men fell within the coverage of the Equal Protection Clause. 10 3 The
challenger, however, further bears the burden to demonstrate the depth
of the implicated right. Practically, this responsibility means that the
challenger must ascertain the degree of scrutiny the Court will apply to
the government's action. By the time of Hogan, a substantial line of authority had fixed the depth of the right at stake in gender-based discriminations as somewhere between highly suspect race-based classifications
and mere economic regulations. 104 The former calls for strict scrutiny,
the latter for rational basis review. The level of review dictated by the
right at risk in Hogan, therefore, was an intermediate standard.
Just as in the evidentiary context, once the challenger meets his burden of production, the burden should shift to the state. The weight of the
state's burden depends entirely on the nature of the right established
through the challenger's proof. In Hogan, the challenger established the
existence of a right sufficiently important that the burden of persuasion
shifted to the state to justify its action: the state had to demonstrate that
its discriminatory practice served an important governmental objective
and was substantially related to the achievement of that objective.105 In
the lexicon of Madisonian Balancing, the challenger had demonstrated
the existence of a central liberty concern. 10 6 The state's asserted objective was to remedy past discrimination against women. As a normative
matter, the Court readily accepted the importance of this objective to the
state's policymaking in the abstract. 10 7 In order to meet its burden of
persuasion, however, the state also had to demonstrate the nexus between
its asserted interest and its action. The Court found that Mississippi
failed to meet this burden and, indeed, believed the state's plan would
produce the opposite result: "[R]ather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women, [Mississippi's] policy of excluding males
from admission to the school of nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."' 0 8
Although the evidentiary analogue proves enormously helpful in
103 Id. at 724 ("That this statute discriminates against males rather than against females does not
exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review."); see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
104 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
105 458 U.S. at 724.
106 Whether the right infringed in gender-based discrimination cases is a central right or some
other can be debated separately. Madisonian Balancing does not provide an answer to this question;
it merely focuses the question and dictates what to do when an answer is settled upon.
107 458 U.S. at 727. It should be noted that although the Court accepted the proposition that a
compensatory purpose could "justify an otherwise discriminatory classification," the actual impact
of the statute here undermined the state's argument that a compensatory purpose actually underlay
the discriminating classification. Id.
108 Id. at 730.
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clarifying the respective responsibilities of the parties in constitutional
adjudication, the analogy is not perfect. In particular, the burden to be
met in the evidentiary context is entirely empirical; 10 9 in the constitutional context, the burden is in part normative.1 10 In Hogan, for example, the challenger met his production burden by synthesizing the
traditional constitutional authorities-text, original intent, precedent,
constitutional-rule facts, constitutional scholarship, and contemporary
values-in order to define or interpret the particular right. Thus, the
initial burden of production is an admixture of interpretation, normative
values, and empiricism, brought together to define the Constitution.'
In practice, constitutional construction does not require proof in the
traditional evidentiary sense at all. Rather, the challenger must prove
the existence and nature of the constitutional right that will serve as au11 2
thority for judicial review of state action.
If and when the burden shifts to the state, the burden of proof again
requires value identification and empirical assessment, but now in a way
that is closer to the trial context analogy. In Hogan, the normative component involved the government's asserted objective to remedy past discrimination. The burden on the government was to demonstrate that
this was an important governmental objective. As a general proposition,
"a State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification." '1 3 In addition, the government also bore the
empirical burden to demonstrate that its action was substantially related
to the asserted objective. The government failed to persuade the Court of
the empirical connection between its action and its objective.11 4 The
Court thus measures the weight or importance of the government interest as an abstract matter and reviews the empirical likelihood that the
government action will accomplish the stated interest.
The combination of the normative and empirical in the state's obligation distinguishes it from the ordinary evidentiary burden of proof.
109 Although, in the evidentiary context, the trier of fact's task is described as entirely empirical,
in practice jurors most assuredly impose their values on their fact finding. This most clearly occurs
when juries "nullify" the law by acquitting an obviously "guilty" defendant. See generally Alan
Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51 (concluding that jurors should be instructed that they have the "power
of nullification").
110 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 17, at 584.
111 For an exhaustive analysis of the difficulties inherent in integrating constitutional authorities,
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100
HARV. L. Rav. 1189 (1987).
112 This burden is something like requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence and scope of a
law that makes her the beneficiary of a presumption. In some sense, of course, plaintiffs bear this
responsibility. In the constitutional context, however, the interpretive task is less straightforward.
113 458 U.S. at 728. This general proposition is limited to only those cases where "members of
the gender benefitted by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification."
Id.
114 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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Satisfaction of the burden depends, therefore, on the combined strength
of the normative interest and the force of the factual showing. The
power of the test lies in its balancing of the state's complete case against
the weight of the liberty concern as demonstrated by the challenger. In
some instances, the normative interest alone might meet the requisite
showing.1 15 In others, no set of facts would satisfy the state's burden.
Most of the time, however, satisfaction of the burden of persuasion will
depend on the soundness of both the state's values and its empiricism. As
will become clear, the balancing metaphor supplies the necessary device
for combining the normative and the factual in constitutional
adjudication.
Still, because the analogy is imperfect, it is potentially misleading.
But using the language of evidence law should not produce significant
confusion, for the law regularly uses similar terms in different contexts.
In any event, the usefulness of the analogy far outweighs any risk. Moreover, to the extent that the analogy too strongly emphasizes the empirical
aspect of constitutional adjudication, this result will only slightly offset
the usual disregard of this component." 6 More likely, some time will
pass before constitutional facts receive the attention they are due.
The use of the burden of proof and presumption alongside the balancing method enormously clarifies and tightens the traditional tests. Its
power derives from making explicit many of the operating assumptions
implicit in the old methodologies. Moreover, Madisonian Balancing alters the perspective by which courts reconcile government objectives and
constitutional interests-the balance is conducted at a Constitution-wide
transactional level rather than a right-specific level. The next subpart
describes the mechanics of Madisonian Balancing in various traditional
constitutional contexts.
B. Madisonian BalancingAcross the ConstitutionalSpectrum
In order to demonstrate the heuristic value of-indeed, the need
for-Madisonian Balancing, I must briefly retrace the ground I traversed
in an earlier article. 117 The need for Madisonian Balancing arises out of
certain basic errors endemic to much of contemporary constitutional adjudication. The Court fails to separate the two traditional prongs of constitutional adjudication: (1) the definition prong and (2) the application
prong. The definition prong refers to the Court's interpretation of the
meaning of the Constitution; in this prong the Court determines whether
the Constitution has been infringed and the depth of any infringement.
In the application prong, the Court applies the construction devised in
115 See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992)).
116 See Faigman, supra note 2, at 581-84.
117 Faigman, supra note 13, passim.
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the first prong to the issues presented in the case before it. This analysis
ordinarily requires the Court to review the government's reasons for infringing a covered right to determine if that infringement is justified. The
Court, however, regularly uses government interest analysis in the process of defining the Constitution instead of evaluating those interests
when applying the Constitution.' 18 By not differentiating the two prongs
of constitutional adjudication, the Court places the burden of disproving
both the rationale and empirical basis of the government regulation on
the challenger.1 19
The Bill of Rights was created to stand as a bulwark against majority tyranny. The scope and parameters of that bulwark thus must be
defined independently of the majority's will. Fundamental to the American system is the belief that constitutional limits on the desires of the
majority are recognizable independent of those desires. As Professor
Dahl explained, to allow the majority to decide "whether the punishing
of some specified act would or would not be tyrannical ...is precisely
what Madison meant to prevent, and moreover would make the concept
of majority tyranny meaningless." 120 If the Bill of Rights operates as a
bulwark against majority tyranny, the majority's reasons for acting cannot define what actions constitute tyranny.
The following section reviews a range of recent Supreme Court cases
in order to illustrate the strength of Madisonian Balancing and to respond to a series of objections that might be raised to this method. It is
organized around the spectrum of constitutional methods, which ranges
from the most formalistic categorical method to the most extreme form
of conventional, ad hoc balancing. Across the entire spectrum, the Court
has violated the basic operating premises of American constitutional democracy. Madisonian Balancing provides clarification across the spectrum and, indeed, replaces the entire range of methods with a
methodology that itself incorporates the values inherent in the old
spectrum.
L Category-Definition.-InEmployment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 12 1 Justice Scalia applied his long preferred
constitutional method of formalistic category-definition 12 2 to the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Smith Court considered
whether Oregon could constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to
an American Indian dismissed from his job for the "religiously inspired"
use of peyote. 123 Justice Scalia framed the issue in Smith as involving the
118 Id. at 1540-47.
119

Id.

120
121
122
123

DAHL, supra note 14, at 24.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
494 U.S. at 874.
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scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 124 He concluded that the Clause was
not implicated, primarily because of the government's need to uniformly
regulate controlled substances 125 and concern over the effects of subjecting all similar government regulations to the rigors of the compelling
interest standard. 126 Scalia thus defined the Free Exercise Clause to exclude religiously inspired peyote use largely on the basis of the state's
1 27
pressing need to regulate drug use in a uniform manner.
Scalia's conclusion that, under the circumstances, the Free Exercise
Clause was not implicated resulted in only the most cursory review of the
government's action. Smith illustrates an extraordinary instance of a violation of the basic Madisonian lesson to keep straight the two prongs of
constitutional adjudication. Scalia used the strong reasons the government offered to justify its action to determine that the Free Exercise
Clause does not extend to this case. In effect, he removed the burden
from the government to justify its action and placed it on the challenger
to refute the government's justification. As Justice O'Connor pointed out
in her concurrence, it is simply incredible to believe that religiously inspired use of peyote does not even implicate the Free Exercise Clause. 128
Madisonian Balancing provides a more cogent and intellectually
forthright structure of decisionmaking. The initial inquiry in Smith puts
the burden of production on the challenger to demonstrate that the Free
Exercise Clause extends to his use of peyote. This would entail an exploration of the historical context and contemporary content of the Clause
and engage the Court in a thorough analysis of the free exercise right.
Madisonian Balancing, however, would not permit any discounting of
the right through consideration of the government's reasons for acting,
except insofar as the clause itself invokes government will. 129 This being
the case, it is difficult to deny that the Free Exercise Clause is at least
implicated in Smith.
The challenger also bears the responsibility, inherent in the burden
of production and the Madisonian paradigm, to describe the depth of the
liberty concern at stake, an obligation that establishes the burden of per124 Id.
125 Id. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially

harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' ") (quoting Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
126 Id. at 888 ("If the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if 'compelling
interest' really means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other
fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.").
127 See Faigman, supra note 13, at 1540-41.
128 494 U.S. at 893-94.
129 Certain provisions of the Bill of Rights might be interpreted as invoking governmental discretion to provide the parameters of the right. The most often cited example is the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Faigman, supra note 13, at 1551-55.
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suasion, if any, the government will bear at the application stage. At this
point Madisonian Balancing confronts the central interpretive questions
of constitutional law. What principles to apply, neutral or otherwise,
and what level of generality (or specificity) to fix must be ascertained in
order to define the depth of Smith's right to use peyote in his religious
practice. I will make no attempt to provide a definitive answer to these
questions here; instead, I explore the manner in which Madisonian Balancing incorporates this great values debate in its process. It must be
emphasized that Madisonian Balancing provides no panacea for constitutional interpretation. Its value lies in making constitutional choices
clearer, not easier; in fact, its greatest contribution lies in making constitutional choices more difficult by forcing the Court to actually make
choices. In Smith, in particular, the most trenchant criticism of Scalia's
majority opinion and O'Connor's concurring opinion concerns their fail130
ure to grapple with the core issues at stake.
O'Connor's concurring opinion exemplifies the Court's failure to answer the difficult questions and, ultimately, reflects the value of Madisonian Balancing. As previously noted,1 3 1 O'Connor challenged Scalia's
definitional prong conclusion that religious use of peyote does not implicate the Free Exercise Clause.1 32 O'Connor, moreover, believed that the
Clause was deeply implicated, for she argued that the government's reasons for infringing the right must be "compelling." 133 In the lexicon of
Madisonian Balancing, this means the challenger had met his burden of
production and had described the depth of the liberty concern as reaching either a central or core level; the burden thus shifted to the government, whose burden of persuasion required a clear and convincing
showing-if not proof beyond a reasonable doubt-that the government's interest and the action taken to achieve that interest outweigh the
liberty concern.
O'Connor concluded that the government's reasons were indeed
compelling. The very significant drug problem in the United States and
the commitment to a "war" on drugs necessitated uniform drug laws
134
that justified infringements of even deeply held constitutional rights.
O'Connor, however, failed to fully examine the government's argument.
The government's burden of persuasion in Smith had two components,
one normative and one empirical. O'Connor cited the strength of the
government's normative position but completely ignored the important
empirical basis for its action. The government introduced no empirical
evidence of the drug problem in general or, more importantly, of the
130 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
131 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
132 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 904.
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relationship between the general drug problem and the necessity of enforcing uniform drug laws with no provision for good faith religious use
of peyote. 135 It is not obvious that carefully drawn exceptions to the
drug laws for religious use of certain controlled substances would lead to
greater drug use in society. Perhaps there is an empirical connection. If
the government did bear the burden of persuasion to demonstrate this
connection, its unsupported assertions were insufficient to meet it.
By its own terms, then, O'Connor's definition of the Free Exercise
Clause should have led to a fuller examination of the government's justification for its action. Madisonian Balancing, however, might not have
led her ineluctably to a different result. It is the nature of balancing that
it permits fine tuning so that one's conclusions are consonant with one's
considered judgments. At the same time, the basis of such conclusions is
made explicit, because the methodology makes it very difficult for the
Court to hide its premises. Ultimately, the single metric of the balancing
scales is constitutionality, a subjective conclusion that is the product of
the weighing of various objective and subjective factors. 136 If O'Connor's
considered judgment is that the government is justified here, Madisonian
Balancing allows her to identify the specific basis for that belief. And by
making this basis explicit, it permits others to challenge her judgment
with particularity.
O'Connor has two alternative responses to the Madisonian critique.
First, she could say that the free exercise right is not quite as important
as she initially thought and, therefore, the burden of persuasion on the
government is not very substantial. Of course, this assertion would require her to confront squarely the nature and scope of the Free Exercise
Clause, an inquiry about which reasonable people can disagree. But any
discounting of the Free Exercise Clause in this case would have a ripple
effect through First Amendment jurisprudence. This is a step that, we
can hope, she would take cautiously. Madisonian Balancing focuses the
Court's attention squarely on the tough issue of defining liberty. If
O'Connor wants to remove the burden to produce empirical research
from the government, she will have to rationalize dilution of a fundamental right using the traditional authorities of constitutional interpretation.
The value of the process lies in forcing her to confront this question.
Alternatively, O'Connor could argue that while the right is indeed
fundamental, the government's asserted basis is so strong that requiring
empirical support is unnecessary. Just last term, in Burson v. Freeman, 137 the Court advanced this logic when it upheld Tennessee's prohibition on campaign activity within 100 feet of an entrance to a polling
place. Although the law was reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard,
135 Id.

136 See Coffin, supra note 20, at 25 ("What balancing does not do, even when done superbly, is
eliminate all subjective forces from decision.").
137 112 S.Ct. 1846 (1992).
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the Court did not demand any empirical evidence of the effectiveness of
the law due to the strength of the government interests involved:
"[B]ecause a government has such a compelling interest in securing the
right to vote freely and effectively, this Court never has held a State 'to
the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective effects on political
stability that [are] produced' by the voting regulation in question." 138
The government interest in Burson was one of constitutional dimensions
and of fundamental importance to a democracy: "the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud." 13 9 Similarly, O'Connor could believe that the drug problem so threatens society
that even the slightest prospect of exacerbating it by permitting religious
use of controlled substances is sufficient to outweigh even deeply held
rights. 140 The greater the asserted harm, under this argument, the less
need for empirical support. The nature of balancing recognizes the cogency of this argument; yet again, O'Connor would be forced to examine
its power on the merits. Drug use does present a significant societal
problem that might alone justify many government actions. As written,
O'Connor's opinion leaves the reader unconvinced that the speculative
increase in drug use that might follow exceptions for religious purposes is
of such major proportions that merely its prospect outweighs the exercise
14 1
of a fundamental right.
Whereas Justice O'Connor might quibble with aspects of Madisonian Balancing, Justice Scalia can be expected to object to it on at least
two fundamental grounds, both of which stem from his preference for
categorical tests. First, he has argued repeatedly that when laws of general application incidentally impinge upon fundamental rights, the Court
should not scrutinize the basis for the government's action. 142 Second,
Scalia finds that very often the value of categorical tests lies simply in
their bright lines, lines that are predictable and which lower courts can
follow consistently. 143 These arguments merit consideration.
138 Id. at 1856 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)).
139 Id. at 1858.
140 Directly contrary to her approach in Smith, Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens's Burson
dissent criticizing the "plurality for blithely dispens[ing] with the need for factual findings." Id. at
1863. Indeed, Justice Stevens's criticism in Burson applies just as well to O'Connor's opinion in
Smith:
[A]lthough the plurality recognizes the problematic character of Tennessee's content-based suppressive regulation.., it nonetheless upholds the statute because "there is simply no evidence"
that commercial or charitable solicitation outside the polling place poses the same potential
dangers as campaigning outside the polling place.... This analysis contradicts a core premise
of strict scrutiny-namely, that the heavy burden of justification is on the State. The plurality
has effectively shifted the burden of proving the necessity of content discrimination from the
State to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1866 (emphasis in original); see Faigman, supra note 13, at 1544-45 & n.83.
141 See McConnell, supra note 130, passim.
142 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
143 See Scalia, supra note 122, at 1186-87.
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If the government's interest in uniform application of the laws outweighs the exercise of a fundamental right, then the government can regulate accordingly. But the existence and nature of the right does not
depend on the strength of the government's interest. The right exists
irrespective of the government's need to regulate it. Scalia achieves at
the front door of definition what he fears to confront in the living room
of application. Scalia's so-called categorical method balances as much as
any balancing scheme; the difference is that Scalia's strong majoritarian
preference results in a balance loaded in favor of the government.
Justice Scalia also strongly values categorical tests for their virtue of
predictability. 144Assuming that categorization increases predictability, a
plausible assumption in many cases, much can be said for bright line tests
and their administrative convenience. Madisonian Balancing does not
deny the merit of bright line tests; it does, however, demand that their
merit be demonstrated in particular contexts. For instance, in Fourth
Amendment cases, administrative warrants might be determined not to
require probable cause or a warrant. 145 This result might follow from the
conclusion that, together with other government interests, the need for a
clear test that government agents can follow outweighs the privacy interest infringed in these cases. 146 Similarly, some bright line tests will weigh
in favor of an individual right, notwithstanding the presence of substantial government interests.
Madisonian Balancing is, in many respects, faithful to and incorporates many of the virtues of categorical tests. It begins by requiring the
challenger to fit herself into a specific liberty category. Only once this is
accomplished is the government called upon to justify its action, and the
strength of this demand varies in direct relation to the nature and scope
of the defined liberty concern. Madisonian Balancing thus contains a
categorical threshold, a gateway defined by constitutional principle
rather than speculative government interests. Categorical tests are inadequate because they cannot capture the nuances and subtlety of principle
that balancing can. Traditional balancing tests fail because they do not
contain the structure and fortitude of principle that formalism does.
Madisonian Balancing borrows the virtues of both these methods.
2. Traditional Balancing Methods.-The purported value of the
definitional method, or formalism, is that it forces the interpreter to determine what is in particular categories and what is out. It appears that
once you step on the slippery slope of balancing, the great benefit of
144 Id. at 1179.
145 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). See generally Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173 (1988).
146 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537-38.
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designating what is out begins to be lost; and as you move toward ad hoc
balancing all is lost. Even the most ardent admirers of balancing lament
the loss of some category definition. 147 This section challenges the assumption that balancing necessarily leads to uncertainty and unpredictability in constitutional adjudication.1 48 In particular, it explores the
ways in which Madisonian Balancing brings clarity to the traditional balancing tests that now wander in a fog of their own creation.
(a) Definitional balancing.-Professor Nimmer advocated the
method of definitional balancing in First Amendment speech cases as a
compromise between an impractical absolutist approach and the free-forall of ad hoc balancing. 14 9 Definitional balancing offers the security of
formalism and the flexibility of ad hoc balancing. It assesses the individual right against the government interests at a high level of abstractness
in order to develop whole categories or spheres of protected activity.
These categories provide the Court with shelter that ad hoc balancing
could not against the incessantly shifting winds of politics. 150 In practice, however, definitional balancing blurs the distinction between the
definitional prong and the application prong and permits great sloppiness
in the balancing process. 15'
The quintessential instance of definitional balancing in the First
Amendment involves state regulation of obscene materials. In Roth v.
United States,152 the Court held that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press."' 53 This conclusion is ambiguous, and this ambiguity has clouded subsequent cases in this area. On
the one hand, this conclusion could mean that obscenity is covered by the
First Amendment but, in light of the strong government interests, it is
not protected. This understanding fully incorporates both prongs of constitutional analysis. On the other hand, the Roth conclusion could mean
that obscenity is not speech at all and thus not within the broad coverage
of the First Amendment. The latter interpretation seems to describe
147 See STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 101-08
(1990).
148 Justice Scalia makes his assumption to this effect explicit:
We will have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my sins, I will probably write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is
that these modes of analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of Rules,
be extended as far as the nature of the question allows.
Scalia, supra note 122, at 1187 (emphasis in original).
149 MELVYN NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-2 (Student ed. 1984).
150 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 147, at I1n.14.
151 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1555-63.
152 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
153 id. at 485.
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Roth itself and is the better explanation for cases following Roth.' 54
In Roth, the Court expressly declined to require any "proof either
that obscene material will perceptibly create a clear and present danger
of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such conduct." 1 55 By effectively defining obscenity out of the category of speech,
the Court perceived no need to evaluate the strength of the government
interests. Yet, it is the government interests themselves that led the
Court to define speech so as not to encompass obscenity. At bottom, the
case against treating obscenity as speech depends on the deleterious effects obscene material has on those reading or viewing it. 156 Because the
Court analyzed the government's interest in the effects of obscenity in the
definitional prong, it effectively placed the burden of proof on the challenger to disprove any empirical connection between obscenity and dele57
terious societal outcomes.1
Madisonian Balancing substantially clarifies the choices presented in
the First Amendment obscenity context. First, the challenger bears the
burden of production to demonstrate that obscenity is within the broad
purview of free speech. Once again, this raises the question of the scope
of speech, or free speech, in the First Amendment, a substantive debate
154 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
noted the ambiguity created by statements like the one made in Roth:
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection of the First Amendment does not extend" to
them. Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is
the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all."
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be
regulated because of theirconstitutionallyproscribablecontent (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be
made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.
Id. at 2543 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia's description of the First
Amendment's coverage conforms well with Madisonian Balancing. As a description of what the
Court itself has been doing in the First Amendment area for the last 35 years, it does not tell the full
story.
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens, concurred in the Court's
judgment but specifically rejected Justice Scalia's reading of the Court's First Amendment cases:
Today, however, the Court announces that earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain categories of expression are "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech."... The present Court submits that such clear statements "must be taken in context"
and are not "literally true."...
To the contrary, those statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 2552 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Faigman, supra note 13, at 1557-62.
155 Roth, 354 U.S. at 486.
156 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) ("[T]here is at least an
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.").
157 The Court has explicitly argued that this empirical burden lies with the challenger: "It is not
for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional case
where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by the Constitution itself." Id. at 60.
But the very conclusion that obscene speech is not an exceptional case protected by the Constitution
hinges on the empirical uncertainties underlying the state legislation.
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beyond the scope of this Article. However, it also raises the issue of the
practicability of fully separating, for analytical purposes, the definitional
prong from the application prong in Madisonian Balancing. Specifically,
given the inordinate ambiguity of constitutional interpretation, does placing the burden of production on the challenger of state action help clarify
this state of affairs?
The first and most obvious benefit of Madisonian Balancing is that it
identifies the party responsible for constructing the meaning and depth of
the allegedly infringed right(s). In the speech context, this might be a
relatively significant burden to bear. 15 8 It also keeps distinct for analytical purposes the definition of speech from the government's reasons for
the regulation. In the speech context, this has proven to be a significant
challenge to meet.
The speech context presents special problems. For instance, the
challenger of an obscenity statute might very well point out the impossibility of distinguishing obscenity from pornography with regard to their
speech aspects; also, much of obscenity looks like or sounds like speech,
despite the assurances of some that they know it when they see it.159
Complicating matters still further, many forms of speech, such as perjury, fraud, and securities violations, have never been traditionally understood as within the coverage of the First Amendment. 16° Madisonian
Balancing thus seemingly presents the rather unpleasant prospect of
sending constitutional analysis careening down the slippery slope into a
brick wall.
A particularly worrisome hypothetical might be the radical political
dissident who assassinates the President in order to protest American
foreign policy. 161 Can this expressive action be deemed speech within the
coverage of the First Amendment? Traditional constitutional analysis
answers with an emphatic no. 162 But the explanation for this result rests
158 See Bork (1971), supra note 14, passim.
159 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Although he could
not offer an "intelligible" definition of hard-core pornography, Justice Stewart concluded that "I
know it when I see it.").
160 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 132, 239-80, 315-

21 (1989).
161 See SHIFFRIN, supra note 147, at 101-02.
162 Id. Professor Shiffrin asks this very question but contemplates a rather different answer than
the one I offer:
Suppose, for example, that a person thoroughly alienated from the culture and life within it
commits an act of mass murder, such as spraying machine gun fire into a random crowd of
people. The act of mass murder might be the product of and a manifestation of the person's
dissent against the culture, and any good psychiatrist might find it to be highly revealing and
expressive. But no one, so far as I am aware, would argue that this act is "expression" or
'speech" for First Amendment purposes.
Id. at 101-02. If nude dancing is expression or speech, then acts of violence might also be similarly
described. Shiffrin's error lies in allowing his definition of speech to be affected by the government's
justification for infringing speech. As Professor Schauer has emphasized, "It is especially important
...to distinguish between activities that are within the scope of the First Amendment and those that
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on the obvious and overwhelming government interest in criminalizing
this activity, not its lack of an expressive component. Madisonian Balancing would reach the same result in the political assassination hypothetical, but with less legerdemain. The political assassination would fall
within the broad parameters of the First Amendment, but it would not
be protected. To be sure, the government would seem to bear a substantial burden of persuasion on the issue of its interest in regulating assassinations. After all, in the definitional prong analysis, an assassination
committed to make a political statement falls within the very core of the
Amendment. 163 Are the government interests compelling enough to outweigh this right? Just to pose the question, of course, is to answer it.164
In other contexts, however, the strength of the government's interest
and the nexus between the regulation and the accomplishment of that
interest will be less easily demonstrated. In many contexts, such as laws
against perjury, fraud, conspiracy, and antitrust violations, the government will have somewhat more difficulty satisfying its burden. 165 As the
gravity of the harm decreases, the government's obligation to demonstrate empirically the connection between its action and the removal of
the harm increases. In some cases, such as perjury, fraud, and conspiracy, the harm is significant and the relationship is fairly clear so that the
government will readily meet the substantial burden necessary to justify
its regulation. In other contexts, however, the burden might loom as a
greater obstacle to overcome.
The obscenity/pornography context illustrates how the state's burden might increase as it is clarified under Madisonian Balancing. As
noted above, because the Court effectively defines obscenity as nonspeech, it eschews any obligation to review the empirical basis for the
government's regulation of these materials. Accepting the argument that
obscenity constitutes speech would bring into sharper relief the government's reasons for its regulation. In the first place, this analysis would
require a more searching examination of the weight of the right impliare not, and at the same time to distinguish between coverage and protection." Frederick Schauer,
Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 905 (1979).
163 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569
(1987) (distributing religious material in airport); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning
draft cards).
164 See also Justice Frankfurter's distinction between a right that is implicated and a right that is
protected:
To state that individual liberties may be affected is to establish the condition for, not to arrive at
the conclusion of, constitutional decision. Against the impediments which particular governmental regulation causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the value
to the public of the ends which the regulation may achieve.
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961).
165 See GREENAWALT, supra note 160, at 132.
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cated and society's tolerance for these materials. The Court would not
be able to avoid doing explicitly what it now does implicitly, that is, articulating the value of obscene speech under the First Amendment. In all
likelihood, this would lead to the determination that obscenity is a marginal liberty concern within the First Amendment. In obscenity cases,
therefore, the burden of production would be on the government and the
ultimate burden of persuasion would be on the challenger. To meet its
burden of production, the government would have to specifically articulate its reasons for regulating obscenity and explain the empirical connection between the regulatory means chosen and those articulated ends.
Under the rational relationship test, as now applied, the government does
not even have the minimal obligation to articulate a legitimate basis; as
long as the Court can think of something-anything-the legislation will
be upheld.1 66 The challenger would subsequently bear the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the government's regulation was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Madisonian Balancing also helps keep straight the components of
constitutional analysis from case to case. For example, assume that the
Court reaches the conclusion through Madisonian Balancing that obscene materials, while constituting speech, have so little value and such
extraordinary potential for harm that the state is justified in prohibiting
them. What happens in the next case when the speech is not obscene but
merely pornographic?
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,167 the Court considered the constitutional validity of an Indiana law barring public nudity as applied to
nude dancing at the petitioner's club. The Court found nude dancing to
be within the First Amendment, albeit at the margin. 68 In effect, the
Court deemed the expressive component of nude dancing to have greater
weight than obscenity. Yet, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined only by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, did not increase the burden of persuasion the state had to meet to justify infringing
this right from that used in the obscenity context. The state bore the
same burden in Barnes as it did in the obscenity context despite the dif69
ference in the nature and depth of the right at stake.1
Justice Souter, concurring, recognized the paucity of support for the
infringement and wrote separately to provide an additional argument for
the government's case. Souter noted that "the statute is applied to nude
dancing because such dancing 'encourag[es] prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other criminal activity.' "170 He found that
166
167
168
169
170

See, eg., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
Id. at 2460.
Faigman, supra note 13, at 1560-63.
111 S.Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37, Barnes (No. 90-

26)).
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the government's burden of production was met by the severity of the
prospect of harm and the general experiential basis for believing there to
be a causal connection between nude dancing and crime. 171 In effect,
Souter applied Madisonian Balancing in Barnes. Nude dancing implicated the First Amendment more deeply than obscenity, but still not fundamentally. If obscenity is a marginal right, then nude dancing might be
a consequential liberty concern.1 72 This consequential liberty was sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the state to demonstrate that
there is, more likely than not, a causal connection between nude dancing
and crime. The state could meet this burden by introducing empirical
research from other cases indicating such a relationship. 173 Of course, if
nude dancing were a central or core First Amendment right, the empirical burden would increase accordingly.
(b) Multitiered balancing tests.-Although multitiered tests
are not always considered balancing decisions, in practice they function
in exactly this way. In fact, as indicated by my use of Hogan v. Mississippi College for Women above, 174 these tests incorporate fairly well, in
theory at least, the lessons of Madisonian Balancing. These tests share
the same central principle of Madisonian Balancing: the Court scrutinizes the state action at a level of rigor corresponding to the constitutional significance of the right at stake. With several notable exceptions,
the Court has used multitiered balancing exclusively in Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause cases. These tests traditionally have not involved full balancing, for the Court has sought to categorize its scrutiny
into three levels: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis
review. Adoption of Madisonian Balancing would not profoundly affect
the theoretical basis of strict and intermediate review; it would, however,
substantially clarify the practice under these heightened standards of review. The second part of this subsection explores heightened scrutiny
review both in its strict and intermediate varieties. The insights of
Id.
172 Although the Court referred to the implicated right in Barnes as "marginal," id. at 2460, this
designation might have to be reconsidered for Madisonian Balancing if obscenity were defined as a
marginal right. Clearly, nude dancing more deeply implicates the First Amendment than obscenity.
Logically, therefore, if obscenity is a marginal right, then nude dancing should receive the greater
protection afforded by designation as a consequential right.
173 Justice Souter explained that, just as in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the state "[is] not compelled to justify its restrictions by studies specifically relating to the problems that would be caused
by adult theaters in that city. Rather '[the city] was entitled to rely on the experiences of ... other
cities... which demonstrated the harmful secondary effects correlated with the presence of even one
[adult] theater in a given neighborhood.'" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986)). As noted in the text, if a central or core liberty concern
were implicated, the Court might very well require empirical proof that specifically pertains to the
circumstances of the case.
174 See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
171
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Madisonian Balancing will have perhaps greater impact on rational basis
review and so this subsection begins with this form of scrutiny.
(i) Rationalbasis review.-Two main issues confront the
Madisonian balancer when considering cases that ordinarily would have
been subjected to rational basis review and might implicate a marginal
liberty concern in the present scheme. First, given the inclusive character of concepts such as due process and equal protection, what checks are
available to curb the Court from finding that the Constitution is at least
implicated in all cases? In other words, what is the nature of the burden
of production placed upon the challenger of state action in these cases?
The second issue concerns the inevitable difficulty the state would have in
demonstrating the basis of its action if the balancer were to consistently
require the government to actually justify its action when subjected to
rational basis review. In other words, what is the nature of the burden of
persuasion, if any, placed upon the government when the challenger has
met her burden of production in these cases?
A potential danger in balancing is that the Court will arrogate to
itself the power to supervise the judgments of the political branches.
With such vague constructs as due process, it would seem, a challenger
would need to do little to meet her burden of production. Once the production burden was met, the Court would then substantively evaluate the
government's justification for acting. The potential for abuse, for
Lochnerizing, is obvious in such a scheme. In current practice, this difficulty is sometimes remedied on the definitional side of the adjudication
equation and sometimes on the application side.' 75 In some cases, especially when the prospect of empirical justification appears slim, the Court
determines the clause not to be implicated at all. 176 Ostensibly, the
Court does not evaluate the state action in these cases. 177 Very often,
however, the Court finds the state action to infringe due process or equal
protection rights that are not fundamental and thus calls for merely a
rational basis to support it. The Court largely evaluates state action
under the rational basis test with the lights turned out.1 78 In effect, rational basis review is equivalent to finding the Constitution not implicated. But if we anticipate putting teeth into rational basis review-and
Madisonian Balancing anticipates doing just this-then we need to consider more seriously the question of what burden lies at the threshold of
constitutional adjudication.
175 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1563-65.
176 See id. at 1548-51 (discussing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
177 In actuality, the Court is very concerned with the government interests, but assesses them at
the definitional stage where the challenger bears the burden to refute them. Id.
178 See Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 73 ("[Multitiered] levels of scrutiny allow the Court to
justify rulings in favor of the government with little analysis of the competing constitutional
interests.").
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The threshold burden must be ascertained by measuring how
strongly the majoritarian principle outweighs the individual rights principle within the original Madisonian model. Classically, the two principles
are considered virtually equal, and thus ensues the dilemma. 179 In regard to balancing individual rights against government interests, the
majoritarian will is privileged because of the predominant place democratic rule occupies in the American constitutional tradition. This means
that at the definitional stage the challenger must come forward with
proof of the existence and scope of asserted constitutional rights. This
burden is not substantial, however, for the majoritarian will supersedes
individual rights only slightly at the systemic level; it is in concrete cases
where the majoritarian will might prevail more strongly and this determination is made at the application stage, not the definitional stage.
In Madisonian Balancing, therefore, vague constructs such as due
process and equal protection invite judicial oversight of the actions of the
political branches. However, the challenger of state action still bears the
responsibility for defining the scope or depth of these vague constructs.
Thus, for instance, the challenger would still bear a substantial burden to
persuade the Court to extend greater protection to economic rights or to
extend the right of privacy to consensual homosexual behavior. 80 The
challenger's success in defining the nature and scope of the particular
right establishes the government's burden of persuasion to justify any
infringement.
Under current practice, infringement of a nonfundamental constitutional right triggers the light scrutiny of the rational basis test. As long
as the government, or the Court, can identify some legitimate government interest that is rationally related to the regulation in question, the
regulation will be upheld. In very few cases does this search come up
empty. Just why the Court should abdicate substantive review in these
cases is not clear. If the Constitution is infringed, should not the Court
investigate?
The conventional explanation is the system's great deference to
majoritarian decisionmaking. The strength of this assumption must be
evaluated. The system has a nearly equal commitment to individual liberties. Only when no right is implicated does the majority have unbridled discretion to act. When a right is infringed, however minimally, the
state should be called upon to justify its action. Under Madisonian Balancing, when liberty is infringed only marginally, the state would be obligated to articulate the interest that motivated the complained of action
and the basis for believing that that action will accomplish the claimed
179 See BORK (1990), supra note 14, at 139-41.
180 Challengers increasingly appear to be having greater success with economic rights than with
privacy rights. Compare Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) with Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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interest. In effect, the state would assume the burden of production to
explain the basis for, and the legitimate interest in, its action.
A likely result of putting teeth into rational basis review would be to
reduce the number of cases in which the Constitution is found to be implicated at all. This result should follow from a more critical and discriminating evaluation of constitutional values. In short, because
Madisonian Balancing raises the stakes at the application prong, greater
attention will. be paid at the definition prong.
This is not a radical proposal. In the typical case involving rational
basis review, the challenger will be successful in defining a liberty concern that is sufficient only to shift the burden of production to the state.
The state's burden to identify a legitimate interest and articulate a rational basis for the law, in the ordinary case, will amount to little more
than a pleading requirement. If the Constitution is infringed, calling
upon the state to explain its action hardly seems radical.
The value of Madisonian Balancing is greatest when the liberty concern under review contains more substance but does not reach the level
of heightened review called for by the standards of intermediate scrutiny
or strict scrutiny. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,18 1 for
example, the Court invalidated, under rational basis review, a zoning ordinance requiring a special permit in order to establish a group home for
the mentally disabled. The Court reached this conclusion because the
record did not support the classification of this home as needing the permit as compared to others who did not need it. 182 Yet, as Justice Marshall pointed out, traditional rational basis review would not entail actual
scrutiny of the record to determine whether the state's actions were
closely tailored to its policies or whether those policies were actually supported by facts.1 3 Cleburne is representative of a number of instances in
which the Court ostensibly applied rational basis review when, in actuality, it scrutinized the government action at a heightened level.18 4 The
apparent explanation for these cases is the Court's desire to avoid the
proliferation of cases receiving heightened scrutiny. 185 But in so doing,
the Court undermines the principle supporting the framework of tiered
review and sows confusion over the parameters of the test. Madisonian
Balancing would permit recognition of gradations between rights, thus
permitting fine adjustments in the level of scrutiny applied. In Cleburne,
two alternative analyses might explain the result. First, if the right is
only marginal, the Court might have found, after reviewing the evidence,
that the challenger had demonstrated that, more likely than not, the state
181 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
182 Id. at 450.
183 Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
184 See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
185 See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1445.
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action did not accomplish the articulated state purpose.18 6 Alternatively,
the Court could have found that the state infringed the Constitution consequentially, thus reaching the conclusion that the state should lose because it failed to produce any evidence. Madisonian Balancing,
therefore, would allow the Court to continue doing what it is doing, but
would require it to explain its reasons for doing so.
(ii) Heightened scrutiny review.-The primary value of
Madisonian Balancing over the semiformalistic tiers of conventional
equal protection and due process analysis is its flexibility in responding to
hard cases. Commentators have long criticized the compartmentalized
tiers of conventional analysis for the arbitrary boundaries they establish.
Not all fundamental rights are equally fundamental, and thus different
cases call for differing degrees of strict scrutiny. Yet, just as in the substantive rational basis review of Cleburne, the Court says it continues to
review these cases under the same standard. This fact has led some to
call for the abolition of a tiered review altogether and the adoption of a
balancing method instead.1 8 7 Madisonian Balancing embraces a modified tiered analysis.
In Roe v. Wade,18 8 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, described the right of privacy at issue to be fundamental and, according to
traditional understanding, stated that the government must demonstrate
a compelling interest to justify infringements of a woman's decision to
have an abortion. 18 9 This analysis resulted in the development of the
trimester framework, which endeavored to reconcile the woman's fundamental right of reproductive choice with the government's changing interests from conception to birth. The trimester framework has not
survived the test of time, or new appointments to the Court. 190 Only one
member of the Court today would reaffirm Roe in all its particularsJustice Blackmun, its author.191 Four Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, reject Roe and the trimester
framework on the ground that a woman's right to an abortion is not
fundamental.192 These Justices would subject abortion regulations to, at
most, rational basis review. The death knell for Roe's trimester frame186 A third alternative explanation for the result in Cleburne was that the right was marginal, but
the state failed to meet its burden of production to articulate a sufficient government interest. The
city council in Cleburne, however, did articulate several government interests to support its action.
473 U.S. at 448-49 (listing concern with negative attitudes of the community, possible taunting by
junior high school students going to school across the street, and the site location on "a five hundred
year flood plain").
187 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally
TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1610 & n.65.
188 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
189 Id. at 154-55.
190 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
191 Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and in the judgment, and dissenting in part).
192 Id.

at 2873.
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work was first sounded by Justice O'Connor in City of Akron v. Akron
Centerfor Reproductive Health193 when she called for application of the
"undue burden" test. 194 Until the October 1991 term, no Justice had
joined this clarion call. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, however,
O'Connor received the support of Justices Kennedy and Souter for a
somewhat modified form of the undue burden test. For now, although it
has the support of only three Justices, this test will be applied by lower
courts to test the constitutionality of abortion regulations. The test, and
in particular its strong factual component, provides an excellent illustration of how valuable Madisonian Balancing can be for clarifying and
tightening traditional constitutional analysis.
In a rare joint opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter described the undue burden test as follows:
Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for
abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves
a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does
the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.195
According to the joint opinion, "[a] finding of an undue burden is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." 196 The undue burden test as formulated,
and as applied by the joint opinion in Casey, thus is principally empirically based. Before examining the operation of this fact-based test, we
must step back to understand its genesis.
The undue burden test was originally formulated by Justice
O'Connor in a series of concurring and dissenting opinions over the last
nine years. 197 O'Connor urged this middle position and disparaged application of a compelling interest standard because of the special "nature
and scope" of the abortion right. 198 In actuality, however, O'Connor has
never explained why the abortion right is unique; rather, she has incorporated the strong government interests she perceives in this context to reduce the fundamental nature of the right. 1 99 The undue burden test
193 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
194 Id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2819.
196 Id. at 2820.

197 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198 Akron, 462 U.S. at 463.
199 Id. at 460.
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results from taking stock of the government interests in regulating the
right of reproductive choice in the definition of that right.
Because the undue burden test merges individual liberty and government interests at the definition stage, no clear burden of proof can be
allocated at the application stage. Indeed, the analytical error is especially obvious in Casey, because of the strong empirical component of the
undue burden test. The Casey joint opinion manifests distinct confusion
over which party bears the burden to demonstrate or refute the fact that
the regulation poses a substantial obstacle to the exercise of the right.
Two provisions of the Pennsylvania law illustrate the problems engendered by the undue burden test. The Pennsylvania law, among other
things, imposed a 24-hour waiting period and contained a spousal notification provision. 20 0 The joint opinion upheld the former and invalidated
the latter. On the 24-hour waiting period, the district court found that it
"increas[ed] the cost and risk of abortions" 20 1 and was "particularly burdensome. '20 2 On the health risks, the joint opinion concluded, "on the
record before us ... we are not convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden. ' 20 3 It appears from the joint opinion
that the burden to show a health risk was with the challenger of the
statute.
In marked contrast, the Court adopted the factual findings of the
district court to strike down the spousal notification provision. The joint
opinion listed the scholarly research it believed indicated that "[t]he
spousal notification requirement.., does not merely make abortions a
little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle. ' 204 In fact, the Court went beyond the find20 5
ings of the district court to cite research that was not in the record.
But the data and facts used to invalidate the spousal notification provi20 6
sion were no more valid than the data on the 24-hour waiting period.
200 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
201 Id. at 2825 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1990)).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 2826.

204 Id. at 2829.
205 Id. at 2880 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206 Close examination of the research studying spousal notification and the 24-hour waiting period indicates no basis for concluding that the former creates a substantial obstacle and the latter
does not.
The Court relied upon the district court's detailed findings of fact regarding the effect of the
spousal notification provision. Id. at 2826-27. The district court found that "the vast majority of
women consult their husbands prior to deciding to terminate their pregnancy." 744 F. Supp. at
1360; see also Brief for the American Psychological Association at 7, Casey (No. 91-902) (citing
Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notification and
MaritalInteraction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 45 (1989), for the proposition that more than 92%
of married women voluntarily consult with their husbands prior to having an abortion). Despite the
small percentage of women likely to be affected by the provision, the lower court found that enforcing the requirement would have a "severe impact on and interfer[e] with the [woman's] abortion
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The distinct impression the joint opinion gives is that the government
had the burden of proof to show that spousal notification would not constitute a substantial obstacle.
The "rootless nature" 20 7 of the undue burden test can be given substantial grounding by use of Madisonian Balancing. Initially, Madisonian Balancing would not permit dilution of the right by appeal to the
importance of the government interests at stake. The principal task is to
define the nature and scope of the right of reproductive choice. In Casey,
while four Justices believed it not to be fundamental, five members reaffirmed the "essential" holding of Roe that the decision to terminate a
pregnancy is a fundamental right. 208 This right falls within the Due Pro210
2 °9
cess Clause alongside such protected areas as marriage, procreation,
decision," and that, in some cases, it would "totally frustrat[e] the woman's decision to have an
abortion." 744 F. Supp. at 1384-85. Given the array of evidence on the effect of the spousal notification requirement, the joint opinion concluded that it "must not blind [itself] to the fact that the
significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be
deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all
cases." 112 S. Ct. at 2829.
The joint opinion, however, did blind itself to the facts surrounding the 24-hour waiting period.
Based on detailed findings of fact, the district court concluded that the mandatory 24-hour waiting
period "unconstitutionally imposes a legally significant burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion." 744 F. Supp. at 1378. Without specifically rejecting the lower court's factual findings, the
Court reversed the lower court and held that the 24-hour waiting period did not constitute an undue
burden. 112 S. Ct. at 2826.
The district court found that the waiting period would create delays that increase the health
risks and economic costs of obtaining an abortion. Every woman seeking an abortion would be
forced to make a minimum of two visits to an abortion provider. The court found that due to
current abortion clinic practices and resources, the 24-hour waiting period would actually result in
delays ranging from 48 hours to two weeks. 744 F. Supp. at 1351. The American Psychological
Association, supporting the court's findings, noted that research indicates that the 24-hour
mandatory waiting period imposed "an excessive burden on many women, and for some women may
prevent them from receiving an abortion." Brief for the American Psychological Association at 22,
Casey (No. 91-902). Of particular concern is the provision's effect of pushing some patients into the
second trimester of their pregnancy, increasing the medical risks related to the abortion procedure.
744 F. Supp. at 1352. Expert testimony revealed that the safest time for the performance of an
abortion is at eight weeks gestation. The risk of maternal death increases by approximately 50%
with each additional week of gestation and the risk of health complications increase by about 30%
per week. Id. at 1343.
Notwithstanding these factual findings, among many others, the joint opinion concluded that
the 24-hour delay does not "create any appreciable health risk." 112 S. Ct. at 2825. Yet the quantum of evidence on the obstacles created by the 24-hour waiting period and the husband notification
provision is virtually the same. Indeed, Justice Stevens concluded that the lower court "establish[ed]
the severity of the burden that the 24-hour delay imposes on many women." Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Whatever the ultimate conclusions might be on the substantiality of the obstacles created by these two provisions, no reasonable fact finder could come to
different conclusions given the evidence available.
207 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208 Id. at 2804.
209 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
210 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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contraception 21 ' and child rearing. 21 2 From the joint opinion together
with the separate opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun, it is clear
that a majority of the Court continues to interpret the right of reproductive choice to be at the very core of protected freedoms.
The difference between the abortion right and other similarly fundamental rights lies in the special nature of the government's interests in
this area. The Casey joint opinion expressly found that the government's
interest in promoting childbirth begins at conception. 21 3 Moreover, this
interest increases in weight over time until at viability it is sufficient to
sustain all prohibitions of abortion except where carrying the fetus to
term would put the mother's life in jeopardy. 21 4 Thus, throughout the
pregnancy, the government has a legitimate interest in promoting maternal health and an ascending interest in the life of the fetus. 21 5
The differences among the five abortion-right members of the Court
principally lie in their respective assessments of the government's interests in regulating abortions. 216 But these differences are more apparent
than real and have been magnified by the muddled undue burden test.
All five agree that the two legitimate government interests in this context
are protection of maternal health and protection of the fetus. The insight
of Roe, still recognized today, is that the strength, how compelling these
interests are, changes throughout the pregnancy. 21 7 For instance, explicit in Roe, and implicit but clear in Casey, is the belief of all five Justices that the government's interest in protecting the fetus is more
substantial in week eighteen than in week eight.
The undue burden test is especially unsuited for measuring government interests as they change in magnitude throughout a pregnancy.
The test is a shorthand for saying that the state cannot erect a substantial
obstacle to the exercise of a right. Yet, at viability, when the government's interest in protecting the fetus becomes compelling, the state can
absolutely prohibit abortion-a substantial obstacle indeed. The test
does not answer the question whether the same obstacle can be substantial in, say, week eight but not substantial in week eighteen. Given the
logic of the joint opinion, depending on the time of the pregnancy, obstacles might be more or less unduly burdensome. If so, the test provides no
211 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
212 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
213 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
214 Id. at 2811.

215 Id. at 2804.
216 The Justices might differ somewhat in their assessments of the depth of the abortion right if
they examined it independently as Madisonian Balancing requires. So far, the debate centers on the
government interests. Justice O'Connor has stated that she believes the abortion right is unusual,
but this conclusion actually rests on the unusual government interests involved. See supra notes 19899 and accompanying text.
217 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
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normative guidance on how to measure substantiality along a time
dimension.
Madisonian Balancing also addresses the recent debate in the legal
literature regarding the constitutional location of the woman's right to
choose. Many legal commentators believe the right should be located in
the Equal Protection Clause.2 18 Because Madisonian Balancing adopts a
Constitution-wide perspective, however, the Court need not specifically
identify the right in the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause. In
fact, both clauses, as well as several others, give substance to the right.
Madisonian Balancing frees the Court to examine the Constitution in its
entirety to ascertain the sundry values implicated by state regulation of
abortion.
Madisonian Balancing offers the abortion-right majority a common
ground, if not a common answer, to the problem of reconciling a "clash
of absolutes." These five Justices have all found the challenger's initial
burden of production to have been met. Moreover, although there may
be some disagreement about the depth or location of the right, they all
accept that it is fundamental; it is either a central or core right within the
Constitution. The burden of proof thus shifts to the state, and it is quite
substantial. At the early stages of pregnancy, the magnitude of the government's interest in the fetus is not great, and thus obstacles that substantially interfere with the abortion right are unconstitutional. In these
early stages, the empirical burden squarely rests on the government. In
the early stages of a pregnancy, therefore, the 24-hour waiting period and
spousal notification clearly would be invalid. As the magnitude of the
state's interest in the fetus increases as the fetus grows, the state increasingly gains an interest in prohibiting all abortions. Hence, over time, the
government increasingly does not have to account for any interference
with the right. The burden effectively rests with the challenger to show
that the state's regulation interferes with the right. At viability, however,
the government's interest has reached such proportions that any rational
regulations will be upheld, notwithstanding their outright prohibition of
abortion.
(c) Ad hoc balancing.--Of the several balancing strategies
219
now employed, ad hoc balancing suffers the most vehement criticism.
The criticisms of ad hoc balancing revolve around the Court's unfortunate tendency to weigh rights and interests without any constitutional
guidelines calibrating the scales. 220 This practice results in the Court,
and the courts below it, evaluating social and economic policy by their
218 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985-86
& n.115 (1984).
219 See, e.g., Frantz, supranote 4, at 1435; Henkin, supranote 3, at 1048; Aleinikoff, supra note 4,
at 948, 980.
220 Faigman, supra note 13, at 1573.
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own individual lights; every court brings its own peculiar myopia to the
task of reading the results off the scales. This means, or at least makes it
appear, that the judiciary is doing the job that is within the province or
competence of the political branches. 22 1 The procedures of Madisonian
Balancing provide substantial structure to conventional ad hoc
balancing.
By this point, the application of Madisonian principles to ad hoe
balancing should seem straightforward enough. In fact, ad hoc balancing
differs from definitional balancing only in the level of analysis. For example, in Mathews v. Eldridge,222 the paradigmatic ad hoc balancing decision, 223 the Court did not fine-tune its balance to the particulars of the
case. Eldridge claimed that due process required an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability
benefits. The Mathews Court announced a three-part balancing test that
would have courts, in each case, weigh (1) the individual right against (2)
the "risk of an erroneous deprivation" and the value of alternative procedures, together with (3) the government's interest both generally and in
the specific administrative alternatives. 224 In Mathews, however, the
Court did not consider how the discontinuance of disability benefits
would affect Eldridge. 225 Instead, the Court applied the Mathews test to
the universe of disability benefits in a way that strongly resembled definitional balancing.
In other contexts, however, the Court does balance the interests in
individual cases on a truly ad hoc basis. In Maryland v. Craig,2 2 6 for
example, the Court considered the constitutionality under the confrontation clause of a statute providing for testimony of a child witness via oneway video camera. The Court held that courts in such cases must balance the psychological effects2 27to the individual witness against the defendant's confrontation right.
Because of the close resemblance between ad hoc balancing and definitional balancing, the Madisonian model operates similarly in the two
contexts. In fact, in true ad hoc balancing cases, the balance involves
facts that are adjudicative in nature and thus might be traditionally understood as amenable to evidentiary procedural rules. In Craig, for in221 Henkin, supra note 3, at 1048.
222 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
223 See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 948.
224 The full statement of the Mathews test requires balancing of the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.

225 Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
227 Id. at 3167.
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stance, the defendant's confrontation right is not going to change from
case to case. The Court, therefore, with the defendant bearing the burden of production, should have assessed the nature and scope of the confrontation right. 228 This assessment would have fixed for future cases the
burden of proof by which the government must prove the psychological
effects on the witness of testifying face-to-face. More than any other
method of constitutional adjudication, ad hoc balancing, when truly ad
hoc, incorporates the two pillars of Madisonian Balancing the most concretely. Courts assess certain constitutional adjudicative facts against a
pre-existing normative standard to determine whether the facts are
known with sufficient confidence and demonstrate a sufficient injury.
CONCLUSION

Madisonian Balancing provides a structure within which we can
"begin again a lively discussion about the fundamental principles that we
believe undergird our political system." 229 The challenge for any constitutional methodology is to provide a framework in which such a "lively
discussion" might take place. Reasonable observers will always disagree
about the meaning and content of the Constitution; the objective of
Madisonian Balancing is to focus that debate.
Madisonian Balancing rests on the essential insight that the Bill of
Rights operates as a bulwark against majority tyranny. At the same
time, this fact creates the danger of minority tyranny, if the Court restricts majoritarian actions too severely in the name of constitutional liberty. This Madisonian dilemma calls for a procedural mechanism to
regulate the boundary between tyranny of the majority and that of the
minority. Madisonian Balancing adopts an evidentiary analogue by
which the concepts of burden of proof and presumptions assist the Court
to sort out the respective burdens of identifying, defining, and supporting
with empirical proof the sundry values and facts of constitutional
adjudication.
In addition, Madisonian Balancing changes the perspective of traditional balancing methods. It calls for balancing at a transactional level of
analysis. When the Court balances in the usual case, it identifies the specific rights implicated by a government action and then proceeds to compare the government's justification for that action against each right
separately. Thus, the government's justification is measured at the transactional level but balanced against rights in their individual capacities.
This effectively double-counts the government's interests, by allowing the
same interests to defeat several rights. Madisonian Balancing proceeds
on the belief that the depth of constitutional infringements change as
228 See Eileen A. Scallen, ConstitutionalDimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
229 Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 1004.
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more than one right is implicated by a government action. In order to
accurately compare the government's justification to the liberty effected
by its action, constitutional rights must be aggregated. Madisonian Balancing, therefore, balances the full constitutional liberty concern against
the complete government justification for infringing upon that liberty.
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